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Executive Summary 
The financial crisis, the economic crisis that followed and finally the sovereign debt crisis of 
euro  area  member  states  have  revealed  shortcomings  and  deficiencies  in  the  existing 
governance architecture for economic matters in the EU, and more heavily in the euro area. 
The economic governance framework (i.e. the coordination of budgets and economic policies 
among Member states) has appeared insufficient and inefficient in managing the challenges 
of the last few years, forcing the establishment or the reinforcing of macro-financial stability 
(MFS) instruments out of the planned governance structure, especially for the euro area: in 
the last few years a total of around €680 billion has been mobilised for financial assistance to 
EU  countries  in  trouble  and  “to  preserve  financial  stability  and  promote  the  return  to 
sustainable  growth”  in  the  Union  (EUCO  30/1/10).
1  The  need  for  this  level  of  financial 
resources was not predicted before the outbreak of the crisis. The Treaty on the Functioning 
of  the  European  Union  (TFEU)  foresaw  only  the  possibility  of  granting  Union  financial 
assistance to non-euro Member states (Art. 143), whereas the so-called ‘no bailout’ clause 
(Art. 125 TFEU) seemed to prohibit EU assistance to euro area member states (or at least 
guarantees for their national debts). To provide this level of resources, two channels have 
been used: 
  EU  common  MFS  instruments.  The  European  Commission,  acting  in  the  financial 
markets  on  behalf  of  the  EU,  manages  three  assistance  facilities,  which  are  the 
European  Financial  Stabilisation  Mechanism  (EFSM)  and  the  Balance-of-Payments 
(BoP) facility in connection with granting funds to EU member states, and the Macro-
Financial Assistance (MFA) facility for non-EU countries.  
  MFS instruments of euro area member states. Through the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF), the 17 euro area member states have established a common fund based 
on national guarantees for granting funds to euro area countries. There are plans to 
replace  the  EFSF  by  July  2012  with  the  permanent  European  Stability  Mechanism 
(ESM). 
The MFA facility is a policy-based financial instrument to support partner non-EU countries 
experiencing  financial  crisis.  Thus,  even  if  it  could  be  numbered  among  the  EU’s  MFS 
mechanisms, it is important to underline that it is not designed to assure the macro-financial 
stability of the EU, since it can only be used to provide assistance outside the Union. It is 
mobilised on a case-by-case basis to provide support, combined with IMF programmes, to 
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countries  dealing  with  serious,  but  generally  short-term  balance-of-payments  or  budget 
difficulties. The first instrument designed to assure macro-financial stability for EU member 
states was the BoP facility that founds its legal basis on Art. 143 of the TFEU to provide 
medium-term financial assistance to non-euro member states with BoP difficulties. It was 
adopted in 1988 and reviewed in 2002, but it was designed only to cover assistance to non-
euro member states, since it was not expected that assistance would be needed for member 
states  benefitting  from  the  stability  of  the  single  currency.  The  first  action  of  the  EU  in 
providing financial assistance to euro area countries in trouble was conducted outside the 
specific provisions of the TFEU. Namely, the €80 billion financial assistance plan from the 16 
euro area members to Greece was managed through as many bilateral loans even if pooled 
by the European Commission. Without acting as a borrower, the European Commission has 
coordinated and administered the disbursements to Greece. Yet only a few days after the 
Greek  package  was  adopted,  intensifying  turbulence  in  the  financial  market  induced  the 
European Council of 10 May 2010 to create a much larger package of financial aid, which 
was initially billed as providing potentially up to €750 billion in funding. One element of this 
was  the  EFSM,  with  a  lending  capacity  of  up  to  €60  billion.  Under  the  EFSM,  the 
Commission acts as the Union’s issuer in the markets, using the EU budget as a guarantee of 
the bonds in case of default by the borrower. The legal basis for setting up the EFSM was Art. 
122(2) of the TFEU. In practice, the EFSM has applied the same mechanisms as the (non-euro 
area) financial assistance by the BoP, a mechanism. To create a reliable firewall against the 
spread of the crisis to the entire euro area, the euro area countries also committed themselves 
to support a separate credit mechanism, the EFSF, based on the €440 billion (later to become 
€780 billion) of guarantees provided by the different euro area member states. At first, the 
EFSF was supposed to remain a purely temporary structure: it is, in fact, a private company 
(more exactly a special purpose vehicle) established in Luxembourg and jointly controlled by 
(finance ministers of) the euro area states, through an intergovernmental approach. The EFSF 
will soon be superseded by a permanent mechanism, which will be implemented based on 
the international Treaty establishing the ESM. 
To provide a better institutional framework for euro area financial assistance to its members, 
on 25 March 2011 the European Council decided to amend the TFEU (EUCO 10/1/11)2, 
adding a specific paragraph (No. 3) to Art. 136: “The member states whose currency is the 
euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the 
stability  of  the  euro  area  as  a  whole.”  This  offered  the  legal  basis  to  fully  deploy  the 
permanent stability mechanism, the ESM, for safeguarding macro-financial stability at the 
euro area level. It is planned that the ESM will become operational in July 2012, with total 
subscribed capital of €700 billion and an effective lending capacity of €500 billion. The paid-
in capital of the ESM will be made available more quickly than initially foreseen by the ESM 
Treaty, in respect of national procedures for ratification. Two tranches of capital will be paid 
in 2012 – the first one in July and the second one by October. Two further tranches will be 
paid in 2013 and a final tranche in the first half of 2014. In line with the ESM Treaty, the 
payment of the capital will be further accelerated if needed to maintain a 15% ratio between 
the paid-in capital and the outstanding amount of ESM issuances. 
The spread of EU financial assistance mechanisms and the introduction MFS instruments 
backed by the EU budget give rise to financial and governance concerns. The EU budget is a 
small financial instrument in relative terms, with inflexible rules and very narrow margins. 
This begs the question of how the EU budget can guarantee large levels of MFS support. 
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The design of the BoP facility and the EFSM ensures that the risks are greatly minimised, so 
that the EU budget is exposed to a clearly ‘ring-fenced’ risk. Four risks could be identified: i) 
market risk: assistance is provided in euros and thus cannot be affected by exchange rate 
fluctuations, leaving the market risk to be borne in full by the country benefitting from the 
assistance;  ii)  interest  rate  risk:  the  terms  of  repayment  for  the  beneficiary  country  are 
determined back-to-back, mirroring the requirements of the bonds issued or any form of 
loan raised, including any management costs or interest. These will be designed to cover the 
exact same terms on which the ESFM or BoP instruments have raised the funding from the 
capital markets through the bond issuances, thus limiting the interest rate risk; iii) credit risk: 
this represents the most important risk, and a risk that the EU budget has to bear under the 
budget ceiling of 1.23% of GNI. Theoretically, if the repayment commitment is large enough, 
there is a risk that the margin between payment appropriations and the EU budget ceiling 
will become too small. Given the large margin in the budget until 2013 and the expected 
large margins from 2014 to 2020, the probability of the margin being too limited appears 
practically inexistent. Of course, a fall in EU GNI combined with unexpected increases in 
payment  appropriations  could  in  theory  have  an  effect,  given  that  the  margin  is  just  a 
fraction of 1% of GNI. The credit risk from 2020 onwards is hard to estimate, as at present the 
budget size in future Multiannual Financial Frameworks cannot be foreseen; iv) liquidity 
risk:  beneficiaries  are  expected  to  repay  their  loan  14  days  in  advance  of  the  date  the 
European  Commission  has  to  pay  the  sums  to  creditors,  thus  securing  the  liquidity 
management. 
Considering the third EU MFS instrument, the amounts of the financial assistance provided 
in grants under the MFA must be consistent with the budget appropriations established in 
the  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  and,  each  year,  the  budgetary  authority  has  to 
authorise the yearly appropriations. The risks linked to MFA assistance are similar to those 
under the BoP facility and the EFSM; however, the risks of a non-repayment of the MFA 
provided in the form of loans appear higher under this MFS instrument, because the assisted 
countries are not EU member states. To address the possible adverse implications of non-
repayment of the loan, the MFA uses as a guarantee for its loan operations the Guarantee 
Fund for external actions, which provides guarantees to external loans by the EIB, Euratom 
and MFA. Technically, the EU budget has a hard ceiling for payments of 1.23% of GNI. This 
means  that  the  sum  that  the  EU  budget  can  guarantee  each  year  cannot  be  above  the 
difference  between  the  expenditures  of  the  budget  in  a  given  year  and  the  ceiling  for 
payments. The maximum amount guaranteed by the EU budget is €110 billion under the Bop 
and EFSM assistance, which is a multiple of the margin in any given year. To ensure the 
stability of the budget, the guarantees are set for the date the assistance is to be repaid; the 
repayment  dates  are  spread  into  the  future  up  to  2041.  Individual  repayments  are 
predictable and the danger for the margins is low, except that after 2020 there is no EU 
budget margin for which to compare the payments Moreover, the spread of the maturity 
dates ensures that the yearly exposure of the budget remains limited, but in some years 
maturity dates have accumulated, in particular for 2015 and 2021. Even if the exposure may 
seem particularly high, this does not necessarily mean that these amounts represent a serious 
and severe risk for the EU budget. 
On  governance,  there  are  difficult  issues  to  address,  since  a  possible  default  by  assisted 
countries on outstanding granted amounts could implicate a considerable political risk. The 
resources of the EU budget are an area of notable contention and a large default would have 
to be covered by the member states through the own resources key. There is a risk of effects 
on  annual  budgetary  discussions  and  even  negotiations  on  the  multiannual  financial 
framework, depending on the size and timing of the impact. Furthermore, the own resources 
key  would  require  the  defaulting  member  state(s)  to  also  participate  in  recovering  the 4 | CASALE, GIOVANNINI, GROS, IVAN, NÚÑEZ FERRER & PEIRCE 
 
financial assistance and the UK rebate – and the reductions accompanying the rebate to the 
GNI contributions of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden – would apply. This 
situation  could  have  interesting  and  controversial  repercussions.  In  fact,  the  defaulting 
member state(s) would remain liable to the EU: in case of a repayment, it would be in full, so 
the  defaulting  member  state(s)  would  have  paid  in  total  in  addition  to  the  outstanding 
amount, its share of GNI plus the contribution to the rebates. 
Although there is little risk that the stability of the budget is threatened by the operations 
owing to their present maximum size and repayment schedules, it is clear, however, that in 
particular for the EFSM, the EU budget perhaps does not represent the most appropriate 
instrument to operate as a guarantee for large assistance programmes to member states. The 
inability of the EU budget to raise funding autonomously to finance itself and to establish 
100% risk coverage for all operations limits the budget’s capacity to play a larger role in 
offering effective MFS instruments to EU member states, especially for the greater economies 
of the euro area. In fact, In case of a default of an assisted country, the Commission would 
initially draw on its cash reserves to service the debt provisionally and amend the yearly 
budget to incorporate the refinancing need. In this way, the budget lines created ad-hoc for 
the MFS instruments can be financed if called upon by the margin of the EU budget, between 
the  payment  appropriations  and  the  own  resources  ceiling  of  EU  budget.  If  these  funds 
would be insufficient, the borrowings undertaken under the three EU MFS instruments are 
direct and unconditional obligations of the EU but are guaranteed by the 27 EU member 
states,  which  are  legally  obliged  by  the  TFEU  to  provide  funds  to  meet  all  of  the  EU’s 
obligations. Thus in the case of a default of an assisted country, the EU member states have 
to  step  in  and  cover  all  the  possible  losses  not  already  covered  by  the  EU  internal 
mechanisms. Thus, to understanding the effect on the EU budget is fundamental to assess 
the potential impact on the national budgets of the member states of possible defaults of the 
euro area countries currently assisted by the euro area MFS instruments: in case of combined 
default of currently assisted euro area member states,  on their outstanding debts towards 
the  other  member  states,  the  resources  involved  would  seriously  endanger  the  public 
finances of euro area member states. 
Considering the democratic control of the European Parliament in the decisions related to 
the management of the MFS assistance, for the two instruments designed to assist member 
states and subject to the EU legal framework (the BoP and the EFSM) there is a relatively 
adequate public audit and parliamentary scrutiny. This is not entirely the case for the two 
MFS instruments managed by euro area member states, the EFSF and from July 2012 the 
ESM. As the ESM is supposed to have a permanent character it is even more important that 
its  provisions  for  democratic  control,  currently  deficient,  should  be  strengthened.  More 
information sharing and public scrutiny are needed for these instruments to enjoy the trust 
of European citizens. The by-laws of the ESM are still under negotiation and they should be 
used to fix the shortcomings in democratic accountability. The MFA decisions, following the 
entry  into  force  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  are  no  longer  taken  by  the  Council  alone,  but  in 
accordance  with  the  ordinary  legislative  procedure  (co-decision  between  the  European 
Parliament  and  the  Council),  which  ensure  a  full  democratic  control  of  the  European 
Parliament in the definition of assistance activities to third countries. 
Concluding, the EU budget does not represent the most adequate tool for MFS operations, in 
particular for the euro area member states, where providing financial assistance requires 
large amounts. For this reason EFSM is most likely going to be superseded by the ESM and 
only remain active as a guarantee for existing commitments or/and as an instrument of last 
resort, without being the instrument of preference. Yet the ESM, despite its characteristic of 
permanence, cannot represent the definitive answer in terms of an EU instrument for macro-BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF EU INSTRUMENTS FOR MACRO-FINANCIAL STABILITY | 5 
financial stability. Eurobonds, under the different forms proposed, could be a plausible EU 
facility for macro-financial stability that could be used in a more or less near future: they 
would imply the move from the current system, in which each country is responsible for its 
own  debt,  to  a  system  of  joint  and  several  guarantee,  in  which  all  countries  are  jointly 
responsible for the common debt issued. The real benefit of the mutualisation of national 
sovereign debts would come from restoring confidence in the euro area, reassuring markets 
on the solvency of member states. Most of the schemes proposed in the recent period, entail a 
joint and several guarantee limited to a certain amount of the national debt; few have a joint 
and several guarantee on the whole national debt and only one takes into consideration a 
pro-rata liability. However, none of them is based mainly on the use of guarantees offered by 
the EU Budget, therefore resulting in almost no impact on the resources of the Union. 6 | CASALE, GIOVANNINI, GROS, IVAN, NÚÑEZ FERRER & PEIRCE 
 
Synthèse 
La crise financière, la crise économique qui a suivi et enfin la crise de la dette souveraine des 
États  membres  de  la  zone  euro  ont  révélé  des  failles  et  des  carences  dans  l’architecture 
existante de gouvernance des questions économiques dans l’Union européenne et, de façon 
plus  marquée,  dans  la  zone  euro.  Le  cadre  de  gouvernance  économique  (c’est-à-dire  la 
coordination des budgets et des politiques économiques entre les États membres) est apparu 
insuffisant et inefficace pour gérer les défis des quelques dernières années, obligeant à mettre 
en place ou renforcer des instruments de stabilité macro-financière au sein de la structure de 
gouvernance  prévue,  en particulier  pour  la  zone  euro  :  au  cours  des quelques  dernières 
années, un montant total d’environ 680 milliards d’euros a été mobilisé pour apporter une 
assistance  financière  aux  pays  de  l’Union  européenne  en  difficulté  et  pour  «préserver  la 
stabilité financière et promouvoir le retour à une croissance durable» dans l’Union (EUCO 
30/1/10)
3. Le besoin d'un tel niveau de ressources financières n’avait pas été prévu avant le 
début de la crise. Le traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne (TFUE) prévoyait 
uniquement  la  possibilité  d’accorder  une  assistance  financière  de  l’Union  à  des  États 
membres n’appartenant pas à la zone euro (article 143), tandis que la clause dite de «non-
sauvetage»  (article 125  du  TFUE)  semblait  interdire  l’octroi  d’une  assistance  de  l’Union 
européenne aux États membres de la zone euro (ou à tout le moins de garanties de leurs 
dettes nationales). Pour fournir ce niveau de ressources, deux canaux ont été utilisés: 
  les  instruments  de  stabilité  macro-financière  communs  de  l’Union  européenne.  La 
Commission  européenne,  agissant  sur  les  marchés  financiers  au  nom  de  l’Union 
européenne,  gère  trois mécanismes  de  soutien,  qui  sont  le  mécanisme  européen  de 
stabilisation  financière  (MESF),  le  mécanisme  de  soutien  des  balances  de  paiement 
concernant  l’octroi  de  fonds  aux  États  membres  de  l’Union  européenne  et  le 
mécanisme  de  soutien  macro-financier  destiné  aux  pays  non-membres  de  l’Union 
européenne.  
  les instruments de stabilité macro-financière des États membres de la zone euro. Au moyen du 
fonds européen de stabilité financière européenne (FESF), les 17 États membres de la 
zone  euro  ont  établi  un  fonds  commun  fondé  sur  des  garanties  nationales  pour 
accorder des fonds aux pays de la zone euro. Il est prévu de procéder, au plus tard en 
juillet 2012, au remplacement du FESF par le mécanisme européen de stabilité (MES) 
permanent. 
Le  mécanisme  de  soutien  macro-financier  est  un  instrument  fondé  sur  les  politiques 
financières destiné à soutenir les pays partenaires n’appartenant pas à l'Union européenne 
qui sont confrontés à une crise financière. Ainsi, même s’il serait possible de le compter 
parmi les mécanismes européens de stabilité macro-financière, il est important de souligner 
que  ce  mécanisme  n’est  pas  conçu  pour  assurer  la  stabilité  macro-financière  de  l’Union 
européenne, puisqu’il ne peut être utilisé que pour fournir une assistance à l’extérieur de 
l’Union. Il est mobilisé au cas par cas afin d’apporter une assistance, en combinaison avec les 
programmes du FMI, à des pays confrontés à des difficultés sérieuses, mais généralement à 
court  terme,  en  matière  de  balance  des  paiements  ou  de  nature  budgétaire.  Le  premier 
instrument conçu pour assurer la stabilité macro-financière des États membres de l’Union 
européenne a été le mécanisme de soutien des balances de paiement, dont la base légale 
figure à l’article 143 du TFUE, en vue d’apporter une assistance financière à moyen terme 
aux États membres n’appartenant pas à la zone euro confrontés à des difficultés en matière 
de  balance  des paiements. Il  a  été  adopté  en  1988  et  révisé  en  2002, mais  il  a  été  conçu 
                                                   
3 Conseil européen, conclusions du Conseil européen des 16 et 17 décembre 2010, EUCO 30/1/10, 
Bruxelles, 25 janvier 2011.  BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF EU INSTRUMENTS FOR MACRO-FINANCIAL STABILITY | 7 
uniquement pour couvrir l’assistance aux États membres n’appartenant pas à la zone euro, 
car on ne prévoyait pas que des États membres bénéficiant de la stabilité de la monnaie 
unique pourraient avoir besoin d’une assistance. La première action de l’Union européenne 
en matière de fourniture d’une assistance financière aux pays de la zone euro en difficulté a 
été  menée  en  dehors  des  dispositions  spécifiques  du  TFUE.  Plus  précisément,  le  plan 
d’assistance  financière  de  80 milliards  d’euros  des  16 États  membres  de  la  zone  euro  au 
bénéfice de la Grèce a été géré au moyen de nombreux prêts bilatéraux, même si ceux-ci ont 
été mis en commun par la Commission européenne. Sans agir en qualité d’emprunteur, la 
Commission  européenne  a  coordonné  et  administré  le  versement  de  l’aide  à  la  Grèce. 
Pourtant,  quelques jours seulement  après  l’adoption  du  paquet grec,  l’intensification  des 
turbulences sur les marchés financiers a conduit le Conseil européen du 10 mai 2010 à créer 
un paquet d’assistance financière beaucoup plus important, qui a été initialement présenté 
comme offrant un financement allant potentiellement jusqu’à 750 milliards d’euros. L’un des 
éléments  de  ce  paquet  était  le  MESF,  dont  la  capacité  de  prêt  pouvait  aller  jusqu’à 
60 milliards d’euros. Dans le cadre du MESF, la Commission agit en qualité d’émetteur de 
l’Union sur les marchés, en utilisant le budget de l’Union européenne comme garantie des 
obligations en cas de défaillance de l’emprunteur. Le MESF a été mis en place sur la base 
juridique de l’article 122, paragraphe 2, du TFUE. En pratique, le MESF a appliqué les mêmes 
mécanismes que l’assistance financière (hors de la zone euro) fournie par le mécanisme de 
soutien des balances de paiement.  
En vue de constituer un rempart fiable contre la propagation de la crise à l’ensemble de la 
zone euro, les pays de la zone euro se sont également engagés à soutenir un mécanisme de 
crédit  distinct,  le  FESF,  fondé  sur  les  440 milliards  d’euros  (montant  qui  devait  passer 
ultérieurement à 780 milliards d’euros) de garantie fournis par les différents États membres 
de  la  zone  euro.  Dans  un  premier  temps,  le  FESF  était  supposé  rester  une  structure 
strictement temporaire: il s’agit en fait d’une société privée (plus exactement d’un véhicule 
ad hoc) établie au Luxembourg et contrôlée conjointement par les (ministres des finances 
des) États membres de la zone euro, au moyen d’une approche intergouvernementale. Le 
FESF sera bientôt remplacé par un mécanisme permanent, lequel sera mis en œuvre sur le 
fondement du traité international instituant le mécanisme européen de stabilité (MES). 
En vue de fournir un meilleur cadre institutionnel à l’assistance financière de la zone euro à 
ses membres, le Conseil européen a décidé, le 25 mars 2011, de modifier le TFUE (EUCO 
10/1/11)4, en ajoutant un paragraphe spécifique (le paragraphe 3) à l’article 136 : «Les États 
membres dont la monnaie est l’euro peuvent instituer un mécanisme de stabilité qui sera 
activé  si  cela  est  indispensable  pour  préserver  la  stabilité  de  la  zone  euro  dans  son 
ensemble».  Cette  disposition  a  fourni  une  base  juridique  au  déploiement  complet  du 
mécanisme de stabilité permanent, le MES, pour préserver la stabilité macro-financière à 
l’échelle de la zone euro. Il est prévu que le MES soit opérationnel en juillet 2012, avec un 
capital  souscrit  total  de  700 milliards  d’euros  et  une  capacité  de  prêt  effective  de 
500 milliards d’euros. Le capital souscrit du MES sera mis à disposition plus rapidement 
qu’initialement prévu par le traité instituant le MES, concernant les procédures nationales de 
ratification. Deux tranches de capital seront versées en 2012 – la première en juillet et  la 
seconde en octobre. Deux autres tranches seront versées en 2013 et une dernière tranche au 
cours du premier semestre 2014. Conformément au traité instituant le MES, le versement du 
capital sera encore accéléré, si nécessaire, afin de maintenir un ratio de 15 % entre le capital 
versé et l’encours des émissions du MES. 
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La  propagation  de  mécanismes  d’assistance  financière  de  l’Union  européenne  et 
l’introduction d’instruments de stabilité macro-financière soutenus par le budget de l’Union 
européenne donnent lieu à des préoccupations en matière financière et de gouvernance. Le 
budget de l’Union européenne est un instrument financier de taille limitée, en termes relatifs, 
soumis à des règles rigides et disposant de marges très étroites. Ceci soulève la question de 
savoir  comment  le  budget  de  l’Union  européenne  peut  garantir  des  niveaux  élevés  de 
soutien de la stabilité macro-financière. 
La conception du mécanisme de soutien des balances de paiement et du MESF assure une 
importante limitation des risques, de sorte que le budget de l’Union européenne est exposé à 
un risque clairement «cantonné». Quatre risques ont pu être identifiés: i) risque de marché : 
l’assistance est fournie en euros et ne peut donc pas être affectée par les fluctuations des taux 
de change, laissant le pays bénéficiant de l’assistance supporter l’intégralité du risque de 
marché;  ii)  risque  de  taux  d’intérêt  :  les  modalités  de  remboursement  pour  le  pays 
bénéficiaire sont déterminées par réciprocité («back-to-back»), afin de refléter les exigences 
des obligations émises ou de toute forme de prêt levé, y compris les frais de gestion ou les 
intérêts. Ces modalités seront conçues pour couvrir exactement les mêmes conditions que 
celles en vertu desquelles le MESF ou l’instrument relatif à la balance des paiements a levé le 
financement sur les marchés financiers au moyen de l’émission d’obligations, limitant ainsi 
le risque de taux d’intérêt; iii) risque de crédit : il s’agit du risque le plus important et d’un 
risque  que  le  budget  de  l’Union  européenne  doit  assumer  en  respectant  le  plafond 
budgétaire de 1,23 % du RNB. Théoriquement, si l’engagement de remboursement est assez 
élevé, il existe un risque que la marge entre les crédits de paiement et le plafond du budget 
de l’Union européenne devienne trop réduite. Compte tenu de la marge importante prévue 
dans  le  budget  jusqu’en  2013  et  des  marges  importantes  attendues  de  2014  à  2020,  la 
probabilité d’une marge trop limitée apparaît pratiquement inexistante. Naturellement, une 
chute  du  RNB  de  l’Union  européenne  associée  à  des  hausses  imprévues  des  crédits  de 
paiement pourrait en théorie avoir un effet, étant donné que la marge ne représente qu’une 
fraction de 1 % du RNB. Le risque de crédit à partir de 2020 est difficile à estimer du fait qu’il 
n’est  pas  possible  de  prévoir  à  ce  jour  la  taille  du  budget  dans  le  futur  cadre  financier 
pluriannuel; iv) risque de liquidité : les bénéficiaires doivent rembourser leur prêt 14 jours 
avant la date à laquelle la Commission européenne doit verser les sommes aux créanciers, 
assurant ainsi la gestion des liquidités. 
S’agissant du troisième instrument de stabilité macro-financière de l’Union européenne, les 
montants  de  l’assistance  financière  accordée  sous  forme  de  subventions  en  vertu  du 
mécanisme de soutien macro-financier doivent être conformes aux crédits budgétaires établis 
dans le cadre financier pluriannuel et, chaque année, l’autorité budgétaire doit autoriser les 
crédits annuels. Les risques liés à l’assistance accordée en vertu du mécanisme de soutien 
macro-financier  sont  comparables  à  ceux  liés  au  mécanisme  de  soutien  des  balances  de 
paiement et au MESF; cependant, les risques de défaut de remboursement du soutien macro-
financier accordé sous forme de prêts semblent plus élevés en vertu de cet instrument de 
stabilité  macro-financière,  car  les  pays  bénéficiaires  de  l’assistance  ne  sont  pas  des  États 
membres de l’Union européenne. Pour faire face aux éventuelles répercussions négatives 
d’un défaut de remboursement du prêt, le mécanisme de soutien macro-financier a recours, à 
titre  de  garantie  de  ses  opérations  de  prêt,  au  Fonds  de  garantie  relatif  aux  actions 
extérieures,  lequel  fournit  des  garanties  aux  prêts  extérieurs  accordés  par  la  BEI,  par 
Euratom et par le mécanisme de soutien macro-financier. 
Techniquement,  le  budget  de  l’Union  européenne  est  soumis  pour  les  paiements  à  un 
plafond impératif de 1,23 % du RNB. Ceci signifie que la somme que le budget de l’Union 
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budgétaires  pour  une  année  donnée  et  le  plafond  des  paiements.  Le  montant  maximal 
garanti  par  le  budget  de  l’Union  européenne  est  de  110 milliards  d’euros  au  titre  de 
l’assistance  accordée  en  vertu  du  mécanisme  de  soutien  des  balances  de paiement  et  du 
MESF, ce montant étant un multiple de la marge pour toute année donnée. Pour assurer la 
stabilité du budget, les garanties sont établies pour la date à laquelle l’assistance doit être 
remboursée;  les  dates  de  remboursement  sont  réparties  dans  l’avenir  jusqu’à  2041.  Les 
remboursements individuels sont prévisibles et le risque concernant les marges est faible, si 
ce  n’est  qu’après  2020  il  n’existe  pas  de  marge  budgétaire  de  l’Union  européenne  avec 
laquelle comparer les paiements. En outre, la répartition des dates d’échéance garantit que 
l’exposition annuelle du budget demeure limitée, mais, s’agissant de certaines années, les 
dates d’échéance se sont accumulées, en particulier pour 2015 et 2021. Même si l’exposition 
peut paraître particulièrement élevée, ceci ne signifie pas nécessairement que ces montants 
représentent un risque grave et sérieux pour le budget de l’Union européenne. 
En matière de gouvernance, certaines questions sont difficiles à aborder car une éventuelle 
défaillance des pays bénéficiaires sur l’encours des montants accordés pourrait impliquer un 
risque politique considérable. Les ressources du budget de l’Union européenne constituent 
un domaine de dispute notable et toute défaillance importante devrait être couverte par les 
États  membres  selon  la  clef  de  répartition  des  ressources  propres.  Il  existe  un  risque 
d’impacts sur les discussions budgétaires annuelles et même sur les négociations relatives au 
cadre financier pluriannuel, en fonction de l’ampleur de la défaillance et de la date à laquelle 
elle  intervient.  En  outre,  l’utilisation  de  la  clef  de  répartitions  des  ressources  propres 
nécessiterait que le ou les États membres défaillants participent également au recouvrement 
de l’assistance financière et il serait fait application de la correction en faveur du Royaume-
Uni – et des réductions qui accompagnent la correction apportée aux contributions RNB de 
l’Autriche, de l’Allemagne, des Pays-Bas et de la Suède. Cette situation pourrait avoir des 
répercussions  remarquables et  controversées.  En  fait,  le  ou  les  États  membres  défaillants 
resteraient responsables à l’égard de l’Union européenne : en cas de remboursement, celui-ci 
devrait être effectué dans son intégralité, de sorte que le ou les États membres défaillants 
auraient  payé  au  total,  outre  l’encours,  leur  part  du  RNB  ainsi  que  la  contribution  aux 
corrections. 
Bien qu’il y ait peu de risques que les opérations menacent la stabilité du budget, du fait de 
leur taille maximale et des calendriers de remboursement actuels, il est clair, cependant, que, 
s’agissant  en  particulier  du  MESF,  le  budget  de  l’Union  européenne  n’est  peut-être  pas 
l’instrument  le  mieux  adapté  pour  fonctionner  comme  une  garantie  pour  les  grands 
programmes d’assistance aux États membres. Le fait que le budget de l’Union européenne ne 
puisse pas lever de fonds de manière autonome pour se financer et mettre en place une 
couverture de risque de 100 % pour toutes les opérations limite sa capacité à jouer un rôle 
plus important en proposant des instruments de stabilité macro-financière efficaces aux États 
membres, en particulier pour les économies les plus importantes de la zone euro. En fait, en 
cas de défaillance d’un pays bénéficiaire d’une assistance, la Commission puiserait d’abord 
dans ses réserves de trésorerie pour rembourser la dette à titre provisoire et modifierait le 
budget  annuel  pour  y  intégrer  le  besoin  de  refinancement.  De  cette  manière,  les  lignes 
budgétaires créées ad hoc pour les instruments de stabilité macro-financière peuvent être 
financées, si elles sont utilisées, par la marge du budget de l’Union européenne existant entre 
les  crédits  de  paiement  et  le  plafond  des  ressources  propres  du  budget  de  l’Union 
européenne.  Si  ces  fonds  s’avéraient  insuffisants,  les  emprunts  contractés  au  titre  des 
trois instruments  de  stabilité  macro-financière  de  l’Union  européenne  constituent  des 
obligations directes et inconditionnelles de l’Union européenne mais sont garantis par les 
27 États membres de l’UE, qui sont légalement tenus en vertu du TFUE de fournir des fonds 
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d’un pays bénéficiaire d’une assistance, les États membres de l’Union européenne doivent 
intervenir et couvrir toutes les pertes éventuelles qui ne le sont pas déjà par les mécanismes 
internes de l’Union européenne.  
Par  conséquent,  il  est  fondamental,  pour  évaluer  l’incidence  potentielle  sur  les  budgets 
nationaux des États membres d’éventuelles défaillances de pays de la zone euro bénéficiant 
actuellement d’une assistance par le biais des instruments de stabilité macro-financière de la 
zone euro, de comprendre l’effet sur le budget de l’Union européenne :  en cas de défaillance 
combinée des  États membres de la zone euro actuellement assistés à l’égard de leurs dettes, 
les ressources concernées mettraient gravement en danger les finances publiques de tous les 
États membres de la zone euro.  
Eu égard au contrôle démocratique du Parlement européen dans les décisions relatives à la 
gestion de  l’assistance à la stabilité financière, pour les deux instruments destinés à aider les 
États membres et sous réserve du cadre juridique de l’Union européenne (le mécanisme de 
soutien de la balance des paiements et le MESF), il existe une vérification publique et un 
contrôle  parlementaire  relativement  appropriés.  Tel  n’est  pas  tout  à  fait  le  cas  pour  les 
deux instruments de stabilité macro-financière gérés par les États membres de la zone euro, à 
savoir le FESF et, à compter de juillet 2012, le MES. Le MES étant censé avoir un caractère 
permanent,  il  est  encore  plus  important  que  ses  dispositions  en  matière  de  contrôle 
démocratique,  actuellement  déficientes,  soient  renforcées.  Il  est  nécessaire  d’améliorer  le 
partage de l’information et le contrôle public pour que ces instruments bénéficient de la 
confiance des citoyens européens. Le règlement du MES est toujours en cours de négociation 
et  devrait  être  utilisé  pour  combler  les  lacunes  en  matière  de  reddition  de  comptes 
démocratique. Les décisions en matière de soutien macro-financier, à la suite de l’entrée en 
vigueur du traité de Lisbonne, ne sont plus prises par le Conseil seul mais conformément à la 
procédure législative ordinaire (codécision du Parlement européen et du Conseil), laquelle 
assure  un  contrôle  démocratique  complet  du  Parlement  européen  dans  la  définition  des 
activités d’assistance à des pays tiers. 
En conclusion, le budget de l’Union européenne ne constitue pas l’outil le plus approprié 
pour les opérations de stabilité macro-financière, en particulier pour les États membres de la 
zone euro, lorsque l’apport d’une assistance financière nécessite des montants importants. 
Pour cette raison, le MESF va probablement être remplacé par le MES et ne rester actif qu’à 
titre de garantie des engagements existants et/ou d’instrument de dernier recours, sans être 
l’instrument de prédilection. Pourtant, le MES, en dépit de son caractère permanent, ne peut 
constituer la réponse définitive en matière d’instrument européen pour la stabilité macro-
financière. Les euro-obligations, sous les différentes formes proposées, pourraient être un 
mécanisme de l’Union européenne plausible pour la stabilité macro-financière susceptible 
d’être  utilisé  dans  un  avenir  plus  ou  moins  proche  :  elles  supposeraient  le  passage  du 
système actuel, dans lequel chaque pays est responsable de sa propre dette, à un système de 
garantie conjointe et solidaire, dans lequel tous les pays sont conjointement responsables de 
la dette commune émise. Le véritable avantage de la mutualisation des dettes souveraines 
nationales  viendrait  du  fait  que  celle-ci  rétablirait  la  confiance  dans  la  zone  euro,  en 
rassurant  les  marchés  quant  à  la  solvabilité  des  États  membres.  La  plupart  des  régimes 
proposés récemment entraîne une garantie conjointe et solidaire limitée à un certain montant 
de la dette nationale; peu de ces régimes comportent une garantie conjointe et solidaire sur 
l’ensemble de la dette nationale et seul l’un d’entre eux prend en compte une responsabilité 
au  prorata. Cependant,  aucun  d’entre  eux n’est  principalement  fondé  sur  l’utilisation  de 
garanties offertes par le budget de l’Union européenne, ce qui conduit ainsi à une incidence 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die  Finanzkrise,  die  darauf  folgende  Wirtschaftskrise  und  schließlich  die  umfangreiche 
Schuldenkrise  der  Mitgliedstaaten  des  Euroraums  haben  Mängel  und  Defizite  in  der 
bestehenden Governance-Architektur für wirtschaftliche Angelegenheiten in der EU und in 
noch  größerem  Maße  im  Euroraum  aufgedeckt.  Der  Rahmen  für  die  wirtschaftliche 
Governance (d. h. die Koordinierung der Haushalte und der Wirtschaftspolitik unter den 
Mitgliedstaaten) hat sich im Hinblick auf die Bewältigung der Herausforderungen der letzen 
Jahre  als  unzureichend  und  ineffizient  erwiesen  und  erzwingt  die  Einrichtung  bzw.  die 
Verstärkung  makrofinanzieller  Stabilitätsinstrumente  (MFS)  außerhalb  der  geplanten 
Governance-Struktur, insbesondere im Hinblick auf den Euroraum: In den letzten Jahren 
wurde ein Gesamtbetrag in Höhe von ungefähr 680 Mrd. EUR mobilisiert, um EU-Länder in 
Schwierigkeiten  finanziell  zu  unterstützen  und  um  in  der  Europäischen  Union  „die 
Finanzstabilität  zu  wahren  und  die  Rückkehr  zu  nachhaltigem  Wachstum  zu  fördern“ 
(EUCO 30/1/10).5 Der Bedarf an finanziellen Mitteln in diesem Umfang war vor Ausbruch 
der Krise nicht vorherzusehen. Der Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union 
(AEUV) sah lediglich die Möglichkeit der Bereitstellung von Finanzhilfe durch die EU an 
Nicht-Euro-Mitgliedstaaten  vor  (Artikel 143),  wobei  die  sogenannte  „No-Bailout“-Klausel 
(Artikel 125 AEUV) die Unterstützung von Mitgliedstaaten des Euroraums durch die EU 
(oder zumindest Garantien für die nationalen Schulden dieser Staaten) zu verbieten schien. 
Zur Bereitstellung von Mitteln in diesem Umfang wurden zwei Kanäle genutzt: 
  Die gemeinsamen MFS-Instrumente der EU. Die Europäische Kommission, die auf den 
Finanzmärkten  im  Auftrag  der  EU  handelt,  verwaltet  drei  Fazilitäten  zur 
Unterstützung, nämlich den Europäischen Finanzstabilisierungsmechanismus (EFSM), 
die Zahlungsbilanz-Fazilität im Zusammenhang mit der Zuweisung von Mitteln an 
EU-Mitgliedstaaten  und  die  Fazilität  zur  Makrofinanzhilfe  (MFH)  von  Nicht-EU-
Ländern.  
  MFS-Instrumente der Mitgliedstaaten des Euroraums.  
Mit  der  Europäischen  Finanzstabilisierungsfazilität  (EFSF)  haben  die  17 
Mitgliedstaaten des Euroraums einen gemeinsamen Fonds zur Zuweisung von Mitteln 
an die Länder des Euroraums aufgebaut. 
Es  bestehen  Pläne,  die  EFSF  im  Juli 2012  durch  den  Europäischen 
Stabilitätsmechanismus (ESM) zu ersetzen. 
Die  MFH-Fazililtät  ist  ein  politikbasiertes  Finanzinstrument  zur  Unterstützung  von 
Partnerländern außerhalb der EU, die mit einer Finanzkrise konfrontiert sind. Aus diesem 
Grund ist wichtig zu betonen, dass auch wenn diese Fazilität als MFH-Mechanismus der EU 
bezeichnet  werden  könnte,  dieses  Programm  nicht  zur  Sicherung  der  makrofinanziellen 
Stabilität der EU bestimmt ist, da es nur dazu verwendet werden kann, außerhalb der EU 
Unterstützung  zu  leisten. Diese  Fazilität  wird  von  Fall  zu  Fall  in  Kombination  mit IWF-
Programmen eingesetzt, um Länder mit ernsthaften, im Allgemeinen jedoch kurzfristigen 
Zahlungsbilanz- oder Haushaltsschwierigkeiten zu unterstützen. Das erste Instrument, das 
zur  Sicherstellung  der  makrofinanziellen  Stabilität  in  den  EU-Mitgliedstaaten  konzipiert 
wurde, ist die Zahlungsbilanzfazilität, deren Rechtsgrundlage auf Artikel 143 AEUV basiert, 
um  Mitgliedstaaten  mit  Zahlungsbilanzschwierigkeiten  außerhalb  des  Euroraums  eine 
mittelfristige finanzielle Unterstützung zu leisten. Die Faziliät wurde 1988 angenommen und 
2002  überarbeitet,  sie  wurde  jedoch  nur  für  die  Unterstützung  von  Mitgliedstaaten 
außerhalb  des  Euroraums  konzipiert,  da  nicht  davon  ausgegangen  wurde,  dass 
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Mitgliedstaaten, die von der Stabilität der Einheitswährung profitieren, eine Unterstützung 
benötigen würden. Die erste Aktion der EU zur Bereitstellung von Finanzhilfe an Länder des 
Euroraums,  die  in  Schwierigkeiten  geraten  waren,  wurde  außerhalb  der  entsprechenden 
Bestimmungen des AEUV durchgeführt. So wurde die Finanzhilfe in Höhe von 80 Mrd. EUR 
für  Griechenland  von  den  16  Mitgliedern  des  Euroraums  über  ebenso  viele  bilaterale 
Darlehen abgewickelt, auch wenn diese von der Europäischen Kommission in einem Pool 
zusammengefasst  wurden.  Ohne  als  Darlehensgeber  aufzutreten  hat  die  Europäische 
Kommission die Auszahlungen an Griechenland koordiniert und verwaltet. Allerdings nur 
wenige  Tage nach  Annahme  des  Griechenlandpakets  führten  verstärkte  Turbulenzen  auf 
den Finanzmärkten dazu, dass der Europäische Rat am 10. Mai 2010 ein sehr viel größeres 
Finanzhilfepaket schnürte, das ursprünglich für die Bereitstellung von Finanzierungen bis 
zu 750 Mrd. EUR vorgesehen war. Eines der Elemente dieses Pakets ist der EFSM mit einer 
Darlehenskapazität von bis zu 60 Mrd. EUR. Im Rahmen des EFSM handelt die Kommission 
auf den Märkten als Emittent, der im Fall eines Zahlungsausfalls des Darlehensnehmers den 
EU-Haushalt als Garantie für die Schuldverschreibungen verwendet. Die Rechtsgrundlage 
für  den  EFSM  basiert  auf  Artikel 122  Absatz 2  AEUV.  In  der  Praxis  wendet  der  EFSM 
dieselben  Mechanismen  an,  wie  die  Finanzhilfe  (für  den  Nicht-Euroraum)  in  Form  der 
Zahlungsbilanzfazilität.  
Zum  Aufbau  eines  zuverlässigen  Schutzwalles gegen  die  Ausweitung  der  Krise  auf  den 
gesamten Euroraum verpflichteten sich die Länder des Euroraums zur Unterstützung eines 
separaten Kreditmechanismus, des ESFS, der auf Garantien in Höhe von 440 Mrd. EUR (aus 
denen später 780 Mrd. EUR wurden) basiert, die von den verschiedenen Mitgliedstaaten des 
Euroraums bereitgestellt werden. Zunächst war die EFSF ausschließlich als vorübergehende 
Einrichtung gedacht: Tatsächlich handelt es sich hier um ein Privatunternehmen (eigentlich 
mehr  um  eine  Zweckgesellschaft),  das  in  Luxemburg  gegründet  wurde  und  von  den 
(Finanzministern der) Euro-Mitgliedstaaten im Rahmen eines zwischenstaatlichen Ansatzes 
gemeinsam  kontrolliert  wird.  Die  EFSF  wird  bald  durch  einen  ständigen  Mechanismus 
ersetzt  werden,  der  auf  der  Grundlage  des  internationalen  Vertrags  zur  Einrichtung  des 
Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus (ESM) umgesetzt wird. 
Zur  Bereitstellung  eines  besseren  institutionellen  Rahmens  für  die  Finanzhilfe  für  die 
Mitglieder des Euroraums beschloss der Europäische Rat am 25. März 2011 eine Änderung 
des AEUV (EUCO 10/1/11)6, indem er zu Artikel 136 einen spezifischen Absatz (Abs. 3) 
hinzufügte:  „Die  Mitgliedstaaten,  deren  Währung  der  Euro  ist,  können  einen 
Stabilitätsmechanismus einrichten, der aktiviert wird, wenn dies unabdingbar ist, um die 
Stabilität des Euro-Währungsgebiets insgesamt zu wahren.“ Dies bot die Rechtsgrundlage 
für  eine  vollständige  Umsetzung  des  ständigen  Stabilitätsmechanismus,  des  ESM,  zur 
Sicherung der makrofinanziellen Stabilität auf der Ebene des Euroraums. Es ist geplant, dass 
der  ESM  mit  einem  gezeichneten  Gesamtkapital  in  Höhe  von  700 Mrd. EUR  und  einer 
effektiven  Kreditkapazität  von  500 Mrd. EUR  im  Juli 2012  einsatzfähig  wird.  Die 
Kapitalrücklagen des ESM werden schneller bereitgestellt, als zunächst im ESM-Vertrag im 
Zusammenhang mit den nationalen Ratifizierungsverfahren vorgesehen war. Zwei Tranchen 
der Kapitalrücklagen werden 2012 eingezahlt – die erste im Juli und die zweite im Oktober. 
Zwei  weitere  Tranchen  werden  2013  eingezahlt  und  eine  letzte  Tranche  im  ersten 
Halbjahr 2014. Gemäß dem ESM-Vertrag wird die Einzahlung des Kapitals bei Bedarf weiter 
beschleunigt,  um  ein  Verhältnis  von  15 %  zwischen  den  Kapitalrücklagen  und  dem 
ausstehenden Betrag der ESM-Ausgaben zu erhalten. 
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EUCO 10/1/11, Brüssel, 20. April 2011. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF EU INSTRUMENTS FOR MACRO-FINANCIAL STABILITY | 13 
Die Bandbreite der Unterstützungsmechanismen der EU-Finanzhilfe und die Einführung der 
MFS-Instrumente, die durch den EU-Haushalt gedeckt sind, wecken Bedenken im Hinblick 
auf  die  Finanzen  und  die  Governance.  Der  EU-Haushalt  ist  ein  relativ  kleines 
Finanzinstrument mit unflexiblen Vorschriften und sehr engen Grenzen. Hierdurch drängt 
sich  die  Frage  auf,  inwiefern  der  EU-Haushalt  MFS-Unterstützung  in  großem  Umfang 
garantieren kann. 
Die Konzeption der Zahlungsbilanzfazilität und des EFSM gewährleisten, dass die Risiken 
wesentlich minimiert werden, so dass der EU-Haushalt einem eindeutig „eingedämmten“ 
Risiko ausgesetzt ist. Vier Risiken können ausgemacht werden: i) Marktrisiko: Die Hilfe wird 
in  Euro  geleistet  und  kann  daher  nicht  von  Wechselkursschwankungen  beeinträchtigt 
werden, so dass das Marktrisiko in vollem Umfang von dem Land getragen wird, das die 
Hilfe in Anspruch nimmt; ii) Zinssatzrisiko: Die Rückzahlungskonditionen werden für das 
begünstigte Land nach dem Back-to-back-Prinzip gestaltet, in dem die Bedingungen für die 
ausgestellten Schuldverschreibungen oder für andere Arten von Darlehen einschließlich aller 
Verwaltungskosten oder Zinsen sich genau entsprechen. Diese werden so konzipiert, dass 
sie  genau  dieselben  Bedingungen  abdecken,  zu  denen  die  ESFM-  oder 
Zahlungsbilanzinstrumente die Mittel von den Kapitalmärkten mittels einer Ausstellung von 
Schuldverschreibungen  aufgenommen  haben,  wodurch  das  Zinssatzrisiko  eingeschränkt 
wird;  iii)  Kreditrisiko:  Dies  stellt  das  größte  Risiko  dar,  zudem  ein  Risiko,  das  der  EU-
Haushalt  unter  der  Haushaltsobergrenze  von  1,23 %  des  BNE  zu  tragen  hat.  Falls  die 
Rückzahlungsverpflichtung hoch genug ist, besteht theoretisch ein Risiko, dass die Spanne 
zwischen den Zahlungsermächtigungen und der Obergrenze des EU-Haushalts zu gering 
wird. Aufgrund der hohen Spanne im Haushalt bis 2013 und der erwarteten hohen Spannen 
von 2014 bis 2020 ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass die Spanne zu klein wird, praktisch nicht 
gegeben. Selbstverständlich könnte ein Rückgang des EU-BNE in Kombination mit einem 
unerwarteten Anstieg der Zahlungsermächtigungen sich theoretisch auswirken, wenn man 
berücksichtigt,  dass  die  Spanne  nur  einen  Bruchteil  von  1 %  des  BNE  beträgt.  Das 
Kreditrisiko  ist  ab  2020  schwer  einzuschätzen,  da  zum  gegenwärtigen  Zeitpunkt  der 
Haushaltsumfang  künftiger  mehrjähriger  Finanzrahmen  nicht  vorhersehbar  ist;  iv) 
Liquiditätsrisiko: Von den Begünstigten wird erwartet, dass sie ihr Darlehen 14 Tage vor dem 
Zeitpunkt, an dem die Europäische Kommission die Beträge an die Gläubiger zurückzahlen 
muss, bezahlen und auf diese Weise das Liquiditätsmanagement sicherstellen. 
Betrachtet man das dritte MFS-Instrument der EU, so müssen die Beträge, die im Rahmen 
der  MFH  als  Finanzhilfe  bereitgestellt  werden,  mit  den  Haushaltsmitteln,  die  im 
mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen festgelegt wurden, übereinstimmen und die Haushaltsbehörde 
muss  die  jährlichen  Mittel  bewilligen.  Die  mit  einer  MFH-Unterstützung  verbundenen 
Risiken sind ähnlich wie die Risiken der Zahlungsbilanzfazilität und des EFSM; allerdings 
scheinen  die  Risiken  einer  Nichtrückzahlung  der  MFH,  die  in  Form  von  Darlehen 
bereitgestellt  wird,  im  Rahmen  dieses  MFS-Instruments  höher,  weil  es  sich  bei  den 
unterstützten Staaten nicht um Mitgliedstaaten der EU handelt. Um möglichen negativen 
Auswirkungen  einer  Nichtrückzahlung  des  Darlehens  entgegenzuwirken,  verwendet  die 
MFH den Garantiefonds für externe Transaktionen, über den Garantien für externe Darlehen 
der EIB, Euratom und MFH bereitgestellt werden, als Garantie für ihre Darlehensvorgänge. 
Technisch gilt im EU-Haushalt für Zahlungen eine feste Obergrenze von 1,23 % des BNE. 
Dies bedeutet, dass der Betrag, den der EU-Haushalt jährlich garantieren kann, die Differenz 
zwischen  den  Haushaltsausgaben  in  einem  bestimmten  Jahr  und  der  Obergrenze  für 
Zahlungen nicht überschreiten darf. Der durch den EU-Haushalt garantierte Maximalbetrag 
beläuft sich auf 110 Mrd. EUR für die Zahlungsbilanzfazilität und die EFSM-Unterstützung, 
was ein Mehrfaches der Spanne in den jeweiligen Jahren beträgt. Zur Gewährleistung der 14 | CASALE, GIOVANNINI, GROS, IVAN, NÚÑEZ FERRER & PEIRCE 
 
Haushaltsstabilität sind die Garantien für den Termin festgelegt, zu dem die Unterstützung 
zurückzuzahlen  ist;  die  Rückzahlungstermine  sind  auf  die  Jahre  bis  2041  verteilt. 
Individuelle Rückzahlungen sind vorhersehbar und die Gefahr für die Spannen ist niedrig, 
mit Ausnahme des Umstands, dass nach 2020 keine EU-Haushaltsspanne für Vergleiche mit 
den  Zahlungen  zur  Verfügung  steht.  Zudem  gewährleistet  die  Verteilung  der 
Fälligkeitstermine, dass die jährliche Exposition des Haushalts beschränkt ist; in bestimmten 
Jahren haben sich die Fälligkeitstermine jedoch angehäuft, insbesondere für 2015 und 2021. 
Sogar  dann,  wenn  die  Exposition  besonders  hoch  zu  sein  scheint,  bedeutet  dies  nicht 
notwendigerweise,  dass  diese  Beträge  ein  ernsthaftes  und  schweres  Risiko  für  den  EU-
Haushalt darstellen. 
Hinsichtlich  der  Governance  sind  schwierige  Aspekte  zu  bewältigen,  da  ein  möglicher 
Zahlungsausfall der unterstützten Länder im Hinblick auf ausstehende bewilligte Beträge 
möglicherweise ein bedeutendes politisches Risiko darstellt. Die Mittel des EU-Haushalts 
sind  ein  Bereich,  in  dem  große  Spannungen  auftreten  können  und  ein  umfangreicher 
Zahlungsausfall  müsste  von  den  Mitgliedstaaten  durch  ihre  eigenen  Mittel  aufgefangen 
werden. Es besteht das Risiko von Auswirkungen auf die jährlichen Haushaltsdiskussionen 
und sogar auf die Verhandlungen des mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens in Abhängigkeit vom 
Umfang und dem Zeitpunkt der Belastung. Zudem würde der Rückgriff auf Eigenmittel 
ebenfalls erfordern, dass der bzw. die zahlungsunfähige(n) Mitgliedstaat(en) sich ebenfalls 
an der Erstattung der Finanzhilfe beteiligen und die Korrektur zugunsten des Vereinigten 
Königreichs – sowie die Reduktionen, die mit der Korrektur im Hinblick auf die BNE-
Beiträge von Österreich, Deutschland, den Niederlanden und Schweden einhergehen – 
wäre anwendbar. Eine solche Situation könnte interessante und kontroverse Auswirkungen 
haben.  Tatsächlich  bliebe(n)  der  bzw.  die  zahlungsunfähige(n)  Mitgliedstaat(en)  der  EU 
gegenüber weiterhin haftbar: Im Fall einer Rückzahlung müsste diese in vollem Umfang 
erfolgen,  so  dass  der  bzw.  die  zahlungsunfähige(n)  Mitgliedstaat(en)  zusätzlich  zum 
ausstehenden  Betrag  den  jeweiligen  Anteil  am  BNE  und  außerdem  den  Beitrag  zu  den 
Korrekturen bezahlen müsste(n). 
Obwohl das Risiko gering ist, dass die Haushaltsstabilität durch die Operationen aufgrund 
ihrer aktuellen Maximalhöhe und des Rückzahlungsplans gefährdet wird, ist jedoch klar, 
dass  der  EU-Haushalt  insbesondere  im  Hinblick  auf  den  EFSM  nicht  das  am  besten 
geeignete Instrument für die Bereitstellung von Garantien für umfangreiche Programme zur 
Unterstützung von Mitgliedstaaten darstellt. Die Unfähigkeit des EU-Haushalts, unabhängig 
Mittel zur Eigenfinanzierung zu beschaffen und eine Abdeckung der Risiken von 100 % für 
alle Operationen bereitzustellen, schränkt die Fähigkeit des Haushalts ein, eine größere Rolle 
bei der Bereitstellung von wirksamen MFS-Instrumenten für die Mitgliedstaaten der EU zu 
spielen,  insbesondere  im  Hinblick  auf  die  größeren  Volkswirtschaften  des  Euroraums. 
Tatsächlich  würde  die  Kommission  bei  Zahlungsunfähigkeit  eines  unterstützten  Landes 
zunächst  den  Schuldendienst  vorläufig  aus  Kassenmitteln  leisten  und  den  jährlichen 
Haushalt ändern, um den Refinanzierungsbedarf zu integrieren. Auf diese Weise können die 
ad hoc für die MFS-Instrumente festgelegten Haushaltslinien finanziert werden, falls sie im 
Zusammenhang mit den Zahlungsermächtigungen und der Obergrenze für Eigenmittel des 
EU-Haushalts durch die Spanne des EU-Haushalts abgerufen werden. Falls diese Mittel sich 
als  unzureichend  erweisen  sollten,  stellen  die  im  Rahmen  der  drei  EU-MFS-Instrumente 
aufgenommenen Mittel direkte und unbedingte Verpflichtungen der EU dar, die von den 27 
Mitgliedstaaten, die gemäß AEUV gesetzlich dazu verpflichtet sind, Mittel zur Deckung der 
Verpflichtungen  der  EU  bereitzustellen,  garantiert  werden.  Folglich  werden  die  EU-
Mitgliedstaaten  bei  Zahlungsunfähigkeit  eines  unterstützten  Landes  in  Anspruch 
genommen  und  müssen  alle  möglichen  Verluste  abdecken,  die  durch  die  internen  EU-
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von möglichen Zahlungsausfällen in den Ländern des Euroraums auf den EU-Haushalt bei 
der  Bewertung  der  möglichen  Auswirkungen  auf  die  nationalen  Haushalte,  die  zum 
aktuellen  Zeitpunkt  durch  MFS-Instrumente  für  den  Euroraum  unterstützt  werden,  von 
grundlegender Bedeutung: im Fall eines gleichzeitigen Zahlungsausfalls von Griechenland, 
Irland und Portugal im Hinblick auf ihre ausstehenden Schulden gegenüber der EU sowie 
eines  Austritts  der  Länder  aus  dem  Euroraum  würden  die  öffentlichen  Finanzen  aller 
Mitgliedstaaten  des  Euroraums  ernsthaft  in  Mitleidenschaft  gezogen  und  hätten  eine 
Situation zur Folge, in der alle Mitgliedstaaten des Euroraums möglicherweise nicht mehr in 
der Lage wären, die vereinbarten Garantien einzuhalten.  
In Anbetracht der demokratischen Kontrolle des Europäischen Parlaments bei Entscheidungen 
im  Zusammenhang  mit  der  Verwaltung  der  MFS-Unterstützung  besteht  im  Hinblick  auf  die 
beiden Instrumente, die für eine Unterstützung der Mitgliedstaaten konzipiert wurden und die 
den EU-Rechtsvorschriften unterliegen (die Zahlungsbilanzfazilität und der EFSM) eine relativ 
angemessene  öffentliche  Rechnungsprüfung  und  parlamentarische  Kontrolle.  Dies  ist  nicht 
unbedingt der Fall im Hinblick auf die beiden MFS-Instrumente, die von den Mitgliedstaaten des 
Euroraums verwaltet werden, die EFSF und ab Juli 2012 den ESM. Da der ESM als ständige 
Einrichtung vorgesehen ist, ist es umso wichtiger, dass die entsprechenden Mechanismen zur 
demokratischen Kontrolle, die aktuell mangelhaft sind, gestärkt werden. Um in den Genuss des 
Vertrauens  der  europäischen  Bürger  zu  kommen,  ist  für  diese  Instrumente  ein  stärkerer 
Informationsaustausch und eine größere öffentliche Kontrolle vonnöten. Über die Statuten des 
ESM wird immer noch verhandelt und sie sollten genutzt werden, um die Mängel hinsichtlich 
der demokratischen Rechenschaftspflicht zu beheben. Die MFH-Entscheidungen werden nach 
dem  Inkrafttreten  des  Vertrags  von  Lissabon  nicht  mehr  länger  vom  Rat  alleine  getroffen, 
sondern  in  Übereinstimmung  mit  dem  ordentlichen  Gesetzgebungsverfahren  (gemeinsame 
Entscheidung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rats), das eine vollständige demokratische 
Kontrolle des Europäischen Parlaments bei der Festlegung von Unterstützungsmaßnahmen für 
Drittländer gewährleistet. 
Schließlich stellt der EU-Haushalt nicht das angemessenste Instrument für MFS-Operationen dar, 
insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Mitgliedstaaten des Euroraums, wo für die Bereitstellung von 
Finanzhilfe große Beträge erforderlich sind (insbesondere im Fall einer möglichen zukünftigen 
Unterstützung von Spanien und Italien). Aus diesem Grund wird der EFSM sehr wahrscheinlich 
durch den ESM abgelöst und bleibt nur als Garantie für die bestehenden Verpflichtungen bzw. 
als letztes Hilfsmittel erhalten, ohne das Mittel der ersten Wahl zu sein. Allerdings kann der ESM 
trotz  seiner  Eigenschaft  als  ständige  Einrichtung  als  EU-Instrument  zur  makrofinanziellen 
Stabilität  nicht  die  letztgültige  Antwort  sein.  Europäische  Schuldverschreibungen  in  den 
verschiedenen  vorgeschlagenen  Formen  könnten  eine  plausible  EU-Fazilität  für  die 
makrofinanzielle Stabilität darstellen, die in der mehr oder weniger nahen Zukunft verwendet 
werden könnte: Sie würden die Transformation des aktuellen Systems, in dessen Rahmen jedes 
Land für seine eigenen Schulden verantwortlich ist, in ein System der gesamtschuldnerischen 
Bürgschaft einleiten, in dessen Rahmen alle Länder gemeinsam für die gemeinsamen Schulden 
verantwortlich  sind.  Der  reale  Nutzen  der  Zusammenlegung  der  nationalen 
Staatsverschuldungen ergäbe sich aus der Wiederherstellung des Vertrauens in den Euroraum, 
wodurch  die  Märkte  durch  die  Zahlungsfähigkeit  der  Mitgliedstaaten  beruhigt  würden.  Die 
meisten  der  in  der  jüngsten  Vergangenheit  vorgeschlagenen  Modelle  umfassen  eine 
gesamtschuldnerische Bürgschaft, die auf einen bestimmten Umfang der nationalen Schulden 
beschränkt ist; wenige Modelle umfassen eine gesamtschuldnerische Bürgschaft auf die gesamte 
Staatsverschuldung  und  nur  eines  zieht  eine  anteilsmäßige  Haftung  in  Betracht.  Allerdings 
basiert  keines  der  Modelle  in  erster  Linie  auf  der  Verwendung  der  vom  EU-Haushalt 
bereitgestellten Garantien; daher haben diese Modelle auf die Mittel der EU so gut wie keinen 
Einfluss. 
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Background 
The financial crisis, the economic crisis that followed and finally the sovereign debt crisis of 
euro  area  member  states  have  revealed  shortcomings  and  deficiencies  in  the  existing 
governance architecture for economic matters in the EU, and more heavily in the euro area. 
The economic governance framework (i.e. the coordination of budgets and economic policies 
among member states) has appeared insufficient and inefficient in managing the challenges 
of the last few years, forcing the establishment or the reinforcing of macro-financial stability 
(MFS) instruments out of the planned governance structure, especially for the euro area. 
The severe financial tension seen in the EU shows how the Stability and Growth Pact (based 
primarily on Art. 121 and 126 TFEU) has failed to ensure the effective budgetary oversight 
required under the EU Treaties. For much of the past decade it has succeeded in adequately 
convincing  financial  markets  that  the  euro  area  could  efficiently  manage  the  fiscal  and 
economic differences among member states and that a convergence of all member states was 
underway. The outbreak of the crisis has broken the spell: some euro area member states 
(notably Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy) have come under acute pressure owing 
to swollen deficits, hence restricting their access to financial markets for refinancing their 
debts  (Greece,  Portugal  and  Ireland)  or  provoking  higher  interest  rates  on  new  bond 
issuances (Spain and Italy). As a consequence of this coordination failure, the Euro-Plus Pact, 
signed  in  March  2011  (EUCO  10/1/11),
1  was  expressly  designed  to  improve  the  fiscal 
strength and competitiveness of each member state; besides euro area countries it was signed 
by six member states outside the euro area (Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland 
and  Romania).  Its  signatories  are  bound  to  even  greater  economic  coordination  for 
competitiveness and convergence. The agreement has also introduced a review phase to be 
conducted on a yearly basis by Heads of State and Government. The Euro-Plus Pact has been 
integrated  into  the  European  semester,  with  the  European  Commission  monitoring 
implementation of the commitments.  
At the moment, the EU economic governance response is based on a new set of rules that 
entered into force on 13 December 2011 and that rests on four elements:  
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i)  reinforcing the Stability and Growth Pact, which should deepen fiscal coordination and 
force the member states to make significant progress towards medium-term budgetary 
balances;  
ii)  modifying the excessive deficit procedure;  
iii)  establishing minimum requirements for national budgetary frameworks, in order to 
harmonise the quality standards; and  
iv)  creating a new oversight mechanism that could prevent and correct divergences in 
competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances within the EU. 
Additionally, since 2010, the coordination of economic and fiscal policies has become part of 
the European semester. Put into practice for the first time during the first half of 2011, it is 
designed to ensure that all policies are analysed and assessed together, in order to promote 
EU common discussions on fiscal policy, macroeconomic imbalances and financial sector 
issues. In cases of serious imbalances, an excessive imbalance procedure can be opened for a 
member state to establish a corrective action plan. 
But to ensure the economic stability of the EU and especially the euro area, the common 
rules  are  not  sufficient  per  se  and  other  macro-financial  instruments  have  had  to  be 
established to assist individual member states in financial difficulty. For this reason, the EU 
has set up a wide range of temporary and permanent mechanisms in recent years. These 
financial assistance facilities have actually been created with the specific intent of supporting 
member  states  in  managing  economic  and  financial  crises  and  preventing  the  contagion 
effects that could potentially put the stability of the entire euro area at risk (and also the EU). 
These  instruments  have  since  been  used  to  support  the  distressed  economies  of  Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal at the euro area level and to support Latvia, Romania and Hungary at 
the EU level.  
First, this study intends to clearly describe the establishment, the institutional framework 
and the functioning of these financial assistance facilities for both euro area and non-euro 
member  states.  Section  2  seeks  to  assess  the  potential  impact  on  the  EU  budget  of  the 
instruments – the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), Balance-of-Payments 
(BoP) facility and Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) – that are actually guaranteed by the 
EU budget, describing how they are categorised in the budget and assessing the risks to 
which  the  EU  budget  is  exposed;  it  also  assess  the  impact  of  defaults  on  outstanding 
amounts owed by euro area member states, showing what could be the indirect effect on EU 
budget through the impact on the member states’ public finances. Afterwards, section 3 
considers  how  the  MFS  instruments  are  accountable  and  the  democratic  control  the 
European  Parliament  has  over  them.  Finally,  section  4  looks  at  the  possible  future 
development  of MFS  instruments,  with  consideration  given  to  the proposal  for  so-called 
‘eurobonds’. Section 5 concludes.  
1.  The European instruments for macro-financial stability 
Until now, in order “to preserve financial stability and promote the return to sustainable 
growth”  (EUCO  30/1/10)
2  through  granting  financial  assistance  to  EU  countries  facing 
financial problems, a varying set of macro-financial stability (MFS) instruments has been 
developed, amounting to around €680 billion. The need for this level of financial resources 
was not predicted before the outbreak of the crisis: the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) foresaw only the possibility of granting Union financial assistance 
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to non-euro member states (Art. 143), whereas the so-called ‘no bailout’ clause, (Art. 125 
TFEU) seemed to prohibit EU assistance to euro area countries (or at least guarantees for the 
national debt of euro area members). To provide this level of resources, two channels have 
been used: 
  EU  common  MFS  instruments.  The  European  Commission,  acting  in  the  financial 
markets on behalf of the EU, manages three assistance facilities, which are the EFSM 
and the BoP facility in connection with granting funds to EU member states, and the 
MFA facility for non-EU countries.  
  MFS instruments of euro area member states. Through the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF), the 17 euro area member states have established a common fund based 
on national guarantees for granting funds to euro area countries. There are plans to 
replace  the  EFSF  by  July  2012  with  the  permanent  European  Stability  Mechanism 
(ESM).  
This  section  describes  the  MFS  instruments  according  to  this  macro  division,  clearly 
differentiating the instruments that have repercussions on the EU budget (being based on the 
guarantees it has offered) and the euro area member states’ financial instruments, which rely 
instead on guarantees offered by the individual member states. For each one we describe the 
legal  basis  of  its  establishment,  the  institutional  framework  in  which  it  operates  and  the 
functioning of the financial assistance (see Table 1).  
1.1  EU macro-financial instruments 
Key Findings 
  Since the EU may not borrow to finance a budget deficit, the borrowing conducted 
under these mechanisms involves direct and unconditional obligations of the EU, but 
these are guaranteed by the 27 EU member states, which are legally obliged by the 
TFEU to provide funds to meet all of the EU’s obligations according to Arts. 310 and 
323.  
  The funds raised are in principle lent back-to-back to the beneficiary country, i.e. with 
the same coupon, maturity and amount. 
  The EU (i.e. the Commission acting in the financial markets on behalf of the EU) 
enjoys a triple-A credit rating from the three major rating agencies, which reflects 
very strong member state support and the safety offered by the back-to-back lending 
mechanism. 
The European Commission, acting in the financial markets on behalf of the EU, currently 
manages  three  MFS  instruments,  granting  funds  (through  loans  or  lines  of  credit)  to 
beneficiary countries by issuing debt instruments in the capital markets:  
  BoP assistance, designed to assist EU member states that have not adopted the euro, 
up to €50 billion;  
  the EFSM, intended to support euro area member states, up to €60 billion; and 
  the MFA facility, designed to help non-EU member states. 
Since the EU may not borrow to finance a budget deficit, the borrowing conducted under 
these mechanisms involves direct and unconditional obligations of the EU, but these are 
guaranteed  by  the  27  EU  member  states,  which  are  legally  obliged  by  the  TFEU  to 
provide funds to meet all of the EU’s obligations according to Arts. 310 and 323.  | 4 
Table 1. Overview of MFS instruments 
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In  all  three  of  the  MFS  instruments,  the  European  Commission  (in  accordance  with  the 
Council) is authorised to borrow on the capital markets or from financial institutions in order 
to finance the loans, mainly issuing notes under the Euro Medium-Term Note Programme 
(EMTN),  which  is  intended  primarily  for  securities  offerings  in  Europe.  Following  the 
increases in the EU's borrowing activity stemming from the establishment of the EFSM in 
2010, the Programme Offering Circular was amended accordingly and the amount of the 
Programme has been increased by €60 billion to a total of €80 billion. If needed, the EMTN 
Programme can be further promptly increased to €110 billion (European Commission, 2010). 
The funds raised are in principle lent back-to-back to the beneficiary country, i.e. with the 
same coupon, maturity and amount; a partial exemption is represented by the Irish case, 
where a loan margin of 292.5 basis points is being paid by Ireland under the EFSM. This 
back-to-back principle represents a strong constraint on EU issuance (since the timing and 
maturities of issuance are dependent on the related EU lending activity), but at the same 
time it ensures that the EU budget does not assume any interest rate or foreign exchange 
risk. As EU assistance is of a medium-term nature, the maturity spectrum of the bonds is 
normally 5 to 10 years, but can range from 3 up to 15 years, according to the particular 
conditions of the loans. 
With the activation of the EFSM for Ireland and Portugal, the EU has become a frequent 
benchmark issuer: since 2011, around €40 billion has been raised through 11 issues of bonds 
(for both the BoP and EFSM – see Figure 1). During 2011, around €30 billion was raised 
through seven transactions, while in 2012 (up to April) around €11 billion has been issued: €3 
billion in 30-year bonds in January, €3 billion in 20-year bonds in February, €1.8 billion in 26-
year bonds and €2.7 billion in 10-year bonds in April. For the remainder of 2012, the EU is 
scheduled to raise €2 billion (in September or later) to fund loans for Ireland and Portugal. 
Annual interest and principal obligations range from €1.3 billion in 2012 to a maximum of 
€10 billion in 2021. 
 
Figure 1. EU issuances (2009–April 2012) 
 













10%6 | CASALE, GIOVANNINI, GROS, IVAN, NÚÑEZ FERRER & PEIRCE 
 
Table 2. EU credit rating 
Agency  Rating  Comments 
Fitch Ratings  AAA/stable 
  Rating of the EU based on the support it receives from its 27 
member states 
  Highly conservative and prudential rules set up by the EU 
on lending and borrowing activities 
  EU debt service relies on several layers, including coverage 
of EU borrowings by the EU budget and member states' 
obligations to provide the funds necessary to balance the 
budget* 
Moody’s  Aaa/stable 
  Firm commitment of 27 member states 
  Multiple layers of protection for loan repayments 
  Conservative budget management*  
Standard & Poor's 
AAA/negative 
outlook 
  The EU benefits from multiple layers of debt-service 
protection sufficient to offset the current deterioration in 
member states’ creditworthiness 
  The outlook is negative, reflecting in S&P's view the negative 
outlooks for 16 of the 27 member states** 
* As of March 2012 ** As of January 2012 
Source: European Commission, DG ECFIN. 
 
The EU (i.e. the Commission acting in the financial markets on behalf of the EU) enjoys a 
triple-A  credit  rating  from  the  three  major  rating  agencies  (Table  2),  which  reflects  very 
strong member state support and the safety offered by the back-to-back lending mechanism. 
In  turn,  this  creates  a situation  in  which  the  risk  of  investing  in an  EU  bond  is  entirely 
unrelated to the credit risk of the related EU loan to a beneficiary country. In January 2012, 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) downgraded the outlook for the EU from stable to negative, mainly 
owing to the similar downgrade to a negative outlook for 16 of the 27 EU member states. Yet 
this change should not represent a serious issue for the creditworthiness of the EU (in the 
European Commission’s view), and above all it should not have a serious impact on the 
performance of EU bonds in financial markets. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the composition of the investors in EU bonds. It appears that European 
actors  represent  around  80%  of  all  the  investors  in  EU  bonds,  with  a  predominance  of 
investors  coming  from  currently  AAA-rated  countries  (Germany,  Austria,  France, 
Switzerland  and  Nordic  countries).  A  relevant percentage  (12%)  is  represented  by  Asian 
investors.  Differentiating  the  investors  by  type,  the  highest  percentage  is  represented  by 
fund managers (30%), followed by banks (26%), insurance and pension funds (21%) and 
National Central Banks (21%).  BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF EU INSTRUMENTS FOR MACRO-FINANCIAL STABILITY | 7 
Figure 2. Investor distribution by region 
 
Note: As of 30 April 2012; all issues.  
Source: European Commission, DG ECFIN. 
 
Figure 3. Investor distribution by type 
 
Note: As of 30 April 2012; all issues 
Source: European Commission, DG ECFIN.   
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1.1.1  Balance-of-Payments assistance 
Key Findings 
  The EU has to intervene when a country encounters financial difficulties or threats to 
its economic stability as specified in the Treaty (Art. 143 TFEU). If these imbalances 
affect the balance of payments and the country in question is not a member of the 
euro area, the EU can activate the programme of BoP assistance.  
  The  BoP  assistance  provides  medium  to  long-term  financial  resources  with  the 
objective of stabilising the situation and allowing the member state to return to easily 
raising funds directly in the market. 
  The EFC, acting on the basis of a request submitted by a member state facing financial 
trouble, decides whether to grant the country financial assistance. The decision, made 
after a formal request by the Commission and after consulting the Economic and 
Financial Committee, must be taken by a qualified majority. 
  The Commission, in collaboration with the EFC and other programme partners must 
conclude with the member state a Memorandum of Understanding, containing the 
precise details of the economic policy measures needed, following a path laid down 
by the Council. 
  Assistance may be provided in the form of either loans or lines of credit, with the 
disbursement procedures handled by the Commission. The total outstanding amount 
of loans that can be granted to member states collectively is limited to €50 billion. 
  At the moment there is only a precautionary programme, which has been activated 
for Romania, for up to €1.4 billion. 
 
The EU has to intervene when a country encounters financial difficulties or threats to its 
economic stability as specified in the Treaty (Art. 143 TFEU). If these imbalances affect the 
balance of payments and the country in question is not a member of the euro area, the EU 
can activate the programme of BoP assistance. This mechanism, even if created before the 
recent  sovereign  debt  crisis,  was  established  with  assumptions  very  similar  to  those 
currently applicable to the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, i.e. providing medium to 
long-term financial resources with the objective of stabilising the situation and allowing the 
member state to return to easily raising funds directly in the market.  
When the first BoP support Regulation was adopted in 1988 (Council Regulation (EEC) No. 
1969/88),
9 it was not expected that assistance would be needed for member states benefitting 
from the stability of the single currency. Thus the Regulation only remained in force until the 
final stages of completing the European monetary system, which became a reality in 1999. In 
view  of  the  enlargement  and  the  risks  of  countries  needing  assistance,  however,  the 
Regulation was revived and amended in 2002 (Council Regulation (EC) No. 332/2002),
10 but 
only for non-euro member states and with a support ceiling that was even slightly reduced 
compared with the original (€12 billion compared with the real value of €16 billion of the 
1988 instrument). 
                                                   
9  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No.  1969/88  of  24  June  1988  establishing  a  single  facility  providing 
medium-term financial assistance for Member States' balances of payments, OJ L 178, 8.7.1988. 
10  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No.  332/2002  of  18  February  2002  establishing  a  facility  providing 
medium-term financial assistance for Member States' balances of payments, OJ L 53/1, 23.2.2002. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF EU INSTRUMENTS FOR MACRO-FINANCIAL STABILITY | 9 
Institutional framework. A country in difficulty or seriously threatened by difficulties in its 
balance-of-payments  conditions  can  send  a  request  for  EU  assistance  to  the  European 
Economic  and  Financial  Committee  (EFC).  The  EFC,  acting  on  the  basis  of  a  request 
submitted by a member state facing financial trouble, decides whether to grant the country 
financial assistance. The decision, made after a formal request by the Commission and after 
consulting the Economic and Financial Committee, must be taken by a qualified majority. In 
the event that the plan is accepted, the resolution must contain the following elements: 
  the technical details of the loan, i.e. the agreed amount, the length of the programme 
(usually five years), the system agreed for the disbursements and their number, along 
with other useful information applying to the programme; 
  specifications of the needed economic policy measures that the member state has to 
implement.  These  are  prescribed  by  the  Commission  in  consultation  with  the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and are designed to enable the recipient country to 
restore its financial equilibrium and then regain access to the financial markets; and 
  explicit approval of the economic and financial adjustment programme presented by 
the assisted member state. 
Moreover, to fully establish an EU assistance programme, the Commission, in collaboration 
with  the  EFC  and  other  programme  partners  (such  as  the IMF)  must  conclude  with  the 
member state a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), containing the precise details of the 
economic  policy  measures  needed,  following  a  path  laid  down  by  the  Council.  These 
conditions  are  usually  related  to  measures  of  fiscal  consolidation  (i.e.  reducing  the 
government deficit by reducing expenditures or increasing taxes), structural reforms (e.g. 
labour market reforms and liberalisation of the economy) and public administration reforms 
(i.e. increasing governance effectiveness and privatisation), to stabilise the financial sector 
and  support  growth  (e.g.  improve  administrative  capacity  to  absorb  EU  funds  more 
effectively). Safeguards against fraud are also included to protect member states, as they 
ultimately bear the default risk of these loans.  
Throughout the duration of financial assistance, the Commission (and its partners) reviews 
the progress of the member state in these areas every six months, with the possibility to 
modify them in accordance with the member state, or suspend the release of any further 
instalment if the country does not show progress along the agreed path. But the decision on 
each instalment must be taken by the Council, in consultation with the Commission.  
How the financial assistance functions. Assistance may be provided in the form of either loans 
or lines of credit, with the disbursement procedures handled by the Commission. The funds 
must be raised in a manner that ensures the lowest possible cost; until now they have been 
collected directly from the market by issuing debt securities. For each programme there is a 
planned disbursement schedule agreed by all programme partners, which can nonetheless 
be modified taking into consideration the greater or lesser financial needs of the country, 
according to the developments under the programme. 
The total outstanding amount of loans that can be granted to member states collectively is 
limited  to  €50  billion.  This  cap  is  the  result  of  subsequent  decisions  taken  to  increase  it 
during the financial crisis, given that the initial amount was €12 billion, later increased to €25 
billion in December 2008 (Regulation (EC) No. 1360/2008)
11 and then raised to the current 
                                                   
11  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No.  1360/2008  of  2  December  2008  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No. 
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level in May 2009 (Regulation (EC) No. 431/2009).
12 Once raised in the financial markets by 
the Commission, these funds are given to the state only in euros by transferring them to a 
special account at the National Central Bank (NCB) of the country. All the operations are 
under the supervision of the European Court of Auditors (see section 3.1).  
Table 3. Overview of BoP assistance programmes 
Country  Agreed amount  Disbursed 
Period covered by the 
assistance 
Status of the 
programme 
Romania II  1.4  –  Until March 2013 
Precautionary 
(not activated) 
Latvia  3.1  2.9  Until January 2012  Completed 
Romania I  5.0  5.0  Until June 2011  Completed 
Hungary  6.5  5.5  Until November 2010  Completed 
Remainder for utilisation: 34 
Note: * As of May 2012, € billion 
Source: European Commission, DG ECFIN. 
Current level of utilisation. At the moment there is only a precautionary programme, which 
has been activated for Romania, for up to €1.4 billion. Requested by the country in February 
2011, it was accorded by the Council in May 2011 to stimulate economic growth with an 
emphasis  on  structural  reforms,  while  improving  fiscal  sustainability  and  consolidating 
financial  stability  (Council  Decision  2011/288/EU).
13  This  programme  follows  the  first 
assistance  programme  provided  to  Romania  in  2009-11.  More  specifically,  in  May  2009, 
multilateral financial assistance to Romania was agreed for the overall amount of €20 billion, 
comprising €5 billion from the EU under the BoP assistance programme, €13 billion from the 
IMF and another €2 billion from the World Bank, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Council Decision 2009/459/EC).
14 
The repayment of the 2009 loan will start in 2015, and will include the principal and the 
interest (the average interest rate on the amounts disbursed by the European Commission is 
around 3%).  
The first BoP assistance programme, after its reintroduction in 2002, was activated in 2008, 
when  the  EU provided  €6.5  billion  to  Hungary  to  relieve  the pressures  on  the  country's 
financial markets, as a part of an international financial programme amounting to €20 billion 
(Council Decision 14953/2/08).
15 Yet only €5.5 billion was actually disbursed and access to 
                                                                                                                                                               
balances of payments, OJ L 352/11, 31.12.2008. 
12 Council Regulation (EC) No. 431/2009 of 18 May 2009 amending Regulation (EC) No. 332/2002 
establishing  a  facility  providing  medium-term  financial  assistance  for  Member  States'  balances  of 
payments, OJ L 128/1, 27.5.2009. 
13 Council Decision 2011/288/EU of 12 May 2011 providing precautionary EU medium-term financial 
assistance for Romania, OJ L 132/15, 19.5.2011. 
14  Council  Decision  2009/459/EC  of  6  May  2009  providing  Community  medium-term  financial 
assistance for Romania, OJ L 150/8, 13.6.2009. 
15 Council Decision 14953/2/08 of 4 November 2008 granting mutual assistance for Hungary BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF EU INSTRUMENTS FOR MACRO-FINANCIAL STABILITY | 11 
the  unclaimed  EU  financial  assistance  (€1  billion)  expired  in  November  2010,  when  the 
programme  officially  ended.  Still,  on  21  November  2011  the  Commission (and  the  IMF) 
received a request from the Hungarian authorities for new financial assistance under the BoP 
mechanism. This request was not approved by the Council, which additionally adopted a 
decision suspending the €495 million in scheduled commitments for Hungary under the EU's 
cohesion fund, owing to insufficient measures taken by the country to correct its budget 
deficit.  
The  third  programme  activated  under  BoP  assistance  concerns  Latvia  (Council  Decisions 
2009/290/EC and 2009/289/EC).
16 In light of a rapidly deteriorating economic situation and 
concerns about the health of the banking sector, the Latvian authorities applied in late 2008 
to the EU, IMF and regional neighbours for financial assistance. The EU agreed to contribute 
€3.1 billion under a three-year lending programme as part of multilateral financial assistance 
amounting  to  €7.5  billion.  The  EU  financial  assistance  was  actually  disbursed  in  four 
instalments  totalling  €2.9  billion,  instead  of  the  six  instalments  and  €3.1  billion  initially 
scheduled. Repayments will start in 2014, including the principal and interest (the average 
interest rate on the amounts disbursed by the European Commission is around 3.2%). On 19 
January 2012, Latvia officially completed the assistance programme, while post-programme 
oversight will run until a large part of the EU-funded loans are repaid (see Table 3).  
1.1.2  European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 
Key Findings 
  The EFSM represents the MFS instrument launched by the EU to tackle the problems 
associated with the sovereign debts of euro area countries. It was introduced in May 
2010, immediately after approval of the bilateral loans extended specifically for the 
case  of  Greece. In  fact  the  mechanism  reproduces  the same scheme used  for  BoP 
assistance with the intention of supporting euro area countries. 
  The institutional mechanisms of the EFSM are partially modelled on those of BoP 
assistance, since the procedure follows the same pattern described in section 0, but in 
this  case  more  important  than  the  role  played  by  the  Economic  and  Financial 
Committee is that played by the Eurogroup Working Group, a configuration of the 
EFC in which only the euro area member states, the Commission and the ECB are 
represented.  
  Every six months, since the establishment of the EFSM, the Commission has had to 
review and forward to the Economic and Financial Committee and to the Council its 
view on whether the exceptional circumstances justifying the establishment of this 
MFS instrument are still present, and thus whether the EFSM should be maintained. 
  The  EFSM  can  establish  loans  or  credit  lines,  up  to  a  total  of  €60  billion.  The 
functioning mirrors that of the BoP assistance programmes. However, a peculiarity of 
the EFSM is the possibility (not granted to the BoP facility) to borrow from capital 
markets more funds than those actually disbursed. 
  The EFSM assistance was activated for the first time in December 2010 in support of 
Ireland  for  a  total  of  €22.5  billion.  Moreover,  in  May  2011  it  gave  assistance  to 
Portugal totalling €26 billion.  
                                                   
16 Council Decisions 2009/290/EC of 20 January 2009 providing Community medium-term financial 
assistance for Latvia, OJ L 79/39, 25.3.2009 and 2009/289/EC of 20 January 2009 granting mutual 
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The EFSM represents the MFS instrument launched by the EU (Council Regulation (EU) No. 
407/2010)17  to  tackle  the  problems  associated  with  the  sovereign  debts  of  euro  area 
countries. It was introduced in May 2010, immediately after approval of the bilateral loans 
extended specifically for the case of Greece by the euro area member states. The mechanism 
reproduces the same scheme used for BoP assistance with the intention of supporting euro 
area  countries:  although  the  Regulation  states  that  it  has  been  designed  for  all  the  EU 
members,  the  EFSM  assistance  should  be  activated  “taking  into  account  the  possible 
application of the existing facility providing medium-term financial assistance for non-euro-
area member states’ balances of payments”18, thus limiting its activity mainly to euro area 
member states. In other words, it provides medium-term support for member states that are 
experiencing  or  are  seriously  threatened  by  a  severe  financial  disturbance  due  to  events 
beyond the control of the member state concerned. The EFSM does not exclude recourse by 
the  assisted  member  state  to  financing  programmes  outside  the  EU,  and  in  the  case  of 
multilateral  assistance  programmes  (in  particular  through  the  IMF)  the  Commission 
examines whether EFSM assistance is compatible with the external financing. 
Institutional framework. The institutional mechanisms of the EFSM are partially modelled on 
those of BoP assistance (see section 0). The activation of the funding through the EFSM takes 
place only after the expressed request of financial support is made by a euro area member 
state (containing an assessment of its financial needs) and, simultaneously, the presentation 
of a macroeconomic adjustment programme, outlining the measures the country must take 
to restore its economic stability as agreed with the Commission. Then, the procedure follows 
the same pattern described in section 0, but in this case more important than the role played 
by the Economic and Financial Committee is that played by the Eurogroup Working Group 
(EWG),  a  configuration  of  the  EFC  in  which  only  the  euro  area  member  states,  the 
Commission and the ECB are represented.  
The  disbursement  of  loans  (or  the  opening  of  credit  lines)  granted  to  member  states  is 
managed by the Commission, which verifies at regular intervals (usually quarterly) whether 
the economic policy of the beneficiary member state accords with the agreed adjustment 
programme contained in the MoU. Moreover, the release of each instalment is decided by the 
Council, in consultation with the EWG and the Commission. Finally, the Court of Auditors 
has  the  right  to  carry  out  financial  controls  and  audits  in  order  to  verify  the  legality  of 
financial assistance granted by the EU. 
Every six months, since the establishment of the EFSM, the Commission has had to review 
and  forward  to  the  Economic  and  Financial  Committee  and  to  the  Council  its  view  on 
whether the exceptional circumstances justifying the establishment of this MFS instrument 
are  still  present,  and  thus  whether  the  EFSM  should  be  maintained.  Although  the 
Commission  in  the  last  Communication  has  concluded  that  “the  exceptional  events  and 
circumstances that justified the adoption of Regulation n°407/2010 still exist and that the 
Mechanism should, therefore, be maintained” (European Commission, 2010), it is likely that 
once the ESM enters into force the EFSM will cease to provide new assistance and exist only 
as a guarantee for existing commitments. 
How the financial assistance functions. The EFSM can establish loans or credit lines, up to a total 
of €60 billion. The functioning mirrors that of the BoP assistance programmes (see section 0 
for the detailed description). In this case, however, the ECB acts as the fiscal agent for the 
                                                   
17  Council  Regulation  (EU)  No.  407/2010  of  11  May  2010  establishing  a  European  financial 
stabilisation mechanism, OJ L 118/1, 15.5.2010. 
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administration of the loans between the European Commission and the central bank of the 
beneficiary. A peculiarity of the EFSM is the possibility (not granted to the BoP facility) to 
borrow from capital markets more funds than those actually disbursed, to optimise in this 
way the cost of funding. More specifically, once the decision to grant a loan has been made 
by the Council, the Commission can borrow on funds and keep them in a dedicated cash or 
securities  account  that  is  handled  in  accordance  with  the  rules  applying  to  off-budget 
operations. But these funds cannot be used for any purpose other than to provide financial 
assistance to member states already receiving EFSM assistance. The costs incurred by the 
Union in implementing the financial assistance are entirely borne by the beneficiary. 
Current level of utilisation. The EFSM assistance was activated for the first time in December 
2010  in  support  of  Ireland  for  a  total  of  €22.5  billion  (Council  Decision  17211/10),19 
representing  one-third  of  an  international  bailout  package  comprising  IMF,  EFSF  and 
bilateral loans from the UK, Denmark and Sweden. Programme disbursements are being 
made over 3 years, with an average maximum maturity of 12.5 years. Up to April 2012, €18.4 
billion has been disbursed to Ireland (backed by bonds with an average maturity of 11 years) 
and the remaining €4.1 billion is scheduled to be disbursed by the end of this year. Further 
funding requirements will be financed by EFSF operations and by the IMF, as agreed in the 
initial EU/IMF agreement.  
In May 2011 (Council Decision 10231/11),20 the EFSM gave assistance to Portugal totalling 
€26 billion, also in this case as part (one-third) of the total bailout package funded by the IMF 
and the EFSF amounting to €78 billion. As of May 2012, €20.1 billion has been disbursed, 
backed by bonds with an average maturity of 12 years (see Table 4).  









Ireland  22.5  18.4  2010-13 
IMF, EFSF and bilateral loans 
from the UK, Denmark and 
Sweden 
Portugal  26  20.1  2011-14  IMF and EFSF 
Remainder for utilisation: 11.5 
Note: * As of May 2012, € billion 
Source: European Commission, DG ECFIN. 
                                                   
19 Council Decision 17211/10 of 7 December 2010 on granting Union financial assistance to Ireland 
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1.1.3  EU Macro-Financial Assistance 
Key Findings 
  The MFA facility is a policy-based financial instrument to support partner non-EU 
countries experiencing financial crisis. Thus, even if it could be numbered among the 
EU’s MFS mechanisms, it is important to underline that it is not designed to assure 
the macro-financial stability of the EU, since it can only be used to provide assistance 
outside  the  Union.  It  is  mobilised  on  a  case-by-case  basis  to  provide  support, 
combined with IMF programmes, to countries dealing with serious, but generally 
short-term balance-of-payments or budget difficulties. 
  Since  1990,  55  MFA  decisions  have  been  approved,  with  total  commitments 
amounting to €7.4 billion and effective disbursements of €5.3 billion; 23 countries 
have benefited from support by the MFA, with loan sizes ranging from €15 million to 
€870 million. The MFA instrument also includes grant assistance, which since 2007 
has disbursed €177 million. 
  A  country seeking MFA must  send  a  written,  formal  request  to  the  Commission. 
Then  the  request  must  be  submitted  to  the  ad  hoc  committee,  composed  of 
representatives  of  the  member  states  and  chaired  by  a  representative  of  the 
Commission  (who  nevertheless  does  not  take  part  in  the  committee  vote).  The 
requirements for establishing an MFA programme are defined by the five ‘Genval 
Principles’ agreed in 1995 by the Economic and Financial Affairs Council.  
  Throughout  the  duration  of  the  assistance,  the  Commission  has  to  inform  the 
European  Parliament  and  the  Council  of  developments,  providing  them  with  the 
relevant  documents.  In  addition,  the  annual  appropriations  of  funds  must  be 
authorised  by  the  budgetary  authority  within  the  limits  of  the  agreed  financial 
framework. 
  The year 2010 was one of the most active in the operation of the MFA instrument for 
a decade, reflecting the impact of the global economic crisis and the slow exit from 
the  crisis  of  the  EU's  neighbourhood.  In  2010  three  MFA  programmes  were 
successfully  implemented:  two  programmes  for  Kosovo  (agreed  in  2006)  and 
Lebanon (starting in 2007) respectively, and one for Georgia (agreed in 2009).   
 
The MFA facility is a policy-based financial instrument to support partner non-EU countries 
experiencing  financial  crisis.  Thus,  even  if  it  could  be  numbered  among  the  EU’s  MFS 
mechanisms, it is important to underline that it is not designed to assure the macro-financial 
stability of the EU, since it can only be used to provide assistance outside the Union. It is 
mobilised on a case-by-case basis to provide support, combined with IMF programmes, to 
countries  dealing  with  serious,  but  generally  short-term  balance-of-payments  or  budget 
difficulties.  The  objective  of  the  MFA  is  not  to  build  a  stand-alone,  specific  assistance 
programme, but rather to fill a foreseen, residual gap in external financing that emerges in 
the assistance programmes of multilateral institutions.  
In 1990 the European Council decided to extend the BoP support for member states to third 
countries, as a consequence of the expectation that the economies in transition would need to 
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connection with IMF and World Bank programmes. The first beneficiaries were Israel and 
Algeria  in  1991  and  again  in  1996.  Yet  from  1994  onwards,  the MFA  started  to  play  an 
increasing  role  in  Eastern  Europe  and  particularly  the  Western  Balkans.  The  countries 
targeted  tend  to  be  potential  candidates  for  European  neighbourhood  countries,  with 
positive  spillover  effects  on  the  EU  economy.  Since  1990,  55  MFA  decisions  have  been 
approved, with total commitments amounting to €7.4 billion and effective disbursements of 
€5.3 billion; 23 countries have benefited from support by the MFA, with loan sizes ranging 
from €15 million to €870 million. The MFA instrument also includes grant assistance, which 
since  2007  has  disbursed  €177  million.  Notably,  this  amount  is  budgeted  in  the  external 
action budget, and thus does not create future risks.  
Institutional  framework.  In  contrast  with  the  situation  under  the  EC  Treaty,  who  did  not 
provide the legal framework for MFA, the Art. 212 TFEU, governing economic and financial 
cooperation with third countries, includes MFA, thus providing the legal basis for the MFA 
decisions adopted since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, if the recipient country 
of MFA is a developing country, the decision would be adopted on the basis of Article 209 
TFEU, which governs the EU's development cooperation. Thus, with the entry into force of 
the TFEU, legislative decisions on individual MFA operations are taken by the European 
Parliament and the Council under the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision). However, 
MFA support actually has no legal framework defining the overall strategy and objectives 
and the interventions are based on individual decisions based on a draft Regulation: this can 
further lengthen the decision-making process (European Commission, 2011b). For this reason 
the Commission has proposed a specific framework regulation to streamline the procedure 
for  adopting  MFA  decisions  (European  Commission,  2011d),  but  it  has  not  yet  been 
approved by the Council or European Parliament. 
A country seeking MFA must send a written, formal request to the Commission. Then the 
request  must  be  submitted  to  the  ad  hoc  committee  composed  of  representatives  of  the 
member states and chaired by a representative of the Commission (who nevertheless does 
not take part in the committee vote). Following a positive vote by the committee on the 
specific programme, in conjunction with the requesting country the Commission drafts an 
MoU  containing  all  the  implementing  acts  required  (policy  procedures  and  terms  of 
assistance). The requirements for establishing an MFA programme are defined by the five 
‘Genval Principles’ agreed in 1995 by the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) 
(European Commission, 2011e):  
i)  Exceptional character. The programme must be discontinued when the recipient country 
can rely on financing from other international financial institutions or private capital.  
ii)  Scope. It is reserved to those countries politically important to the EU and which fully 
respect democracy, rule of law and human rights.  
iii)  Complementarity. It is warranted only if there is a residual, external financing gap in 
international programmes for financial assistance.  
iv)  Policy-based  conditionality.  It  is  conditioned  on  the  observance  of  specific  macro-
economic performance and structural adjustment criteria. 
v)  Financial discipline. The amounts provided under MFA have to be consistent with the 
annual EU budget ceilings. 
Throughout  the  duration  of  the  assistance,  the  Commission  has  to  inform  the  European 
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In  addition,  the  annual  appropriations  of  funds  must  be  authorised  by  the  budgetary 
authority within the limits of the agreed financial framework. 
How the financial assistance functions. The MFA facility can be activated only if an IMF or 
World Bank programme is already active for the same country and the same period. Support 
from the MFA takes the form of loans or grants, or a combination of both. The experience 
with MFA operations in the 1990s showed that most MFA support (86% in terms of financial 
volume) took the form of loans; but in 2000, the grant increased, and over the period 2000-04, 
47% of the total MFA took the form of grants. In the case of a loan, the Commission is 
entitled to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions 
on behalf of the Union and on-lend them to the beneficiary country. All the operations must 
be  denominated  in  euros  and  not  permit  any  EU  involvement  in  the  process  of  the 
transformation of maturities, or in any exchange or interest rate risk. All the disbursements 
have to be deposited at the central bank of the beneficiary country, according to the progress 
made by the country and after the decision of the Committee. Indeed, overall supervision of 
the implementation of the MoU is assigned to the Commission, which can carry out spot 
checks  and  inspections  to  verify  whether  the  objectives  have  been  met  and  formulate 
specific,  additional  recommendations  to  improve  future  operations.  If  the  conditions 
pertaining to support from the MFA facility are not met, the Commission can temporarily 
suspend, reduce or cancel the disbursement of the assistance. Finally, all the costs involved 
in raising and managing the funds are borne by the beneficiary country. 
Current level of utilisation. The year 2010 was one of the most active in the operation of the 
MFA instrument for a decade, reflecting the impact of the global economic crisis and the 
slow exit from the crisis of the EU's neighbourhood. Over the previous ten years, use of the 
MFA  facility  progressively  declined  owing  to  a  relatively  stable,  global  economic 
environment characterised by an abundant supply of relatively cheap private capital (EPEC, 
2009)  (Figure  4).  In  2010  three  MFA  programmes  were  successfully  implemented:  two 
programmes for Kosovo (agreed in 2006) and Lebanon (starting in 2007) respectively, and 
one for Georgia, with the latter having been among the four programmes approved by the 
Council  on  30  November  2009.  In  relation  to  the  other  three  operations  decided  at  that 
Council  meeting  –  in  favour  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Serbia  and  Armenia  –  no 
disbursements took place in 2010 or in early 2011, owing to increasing delays encountered by 
the  Commission  in  agreeing  the  economic  conditions  for  the  programmes  with  the 
beneficiary countries. In 2010 another two MFA programmes were adopted, this time for 
Ukraine (€500 million) and the Republic of Moldova (€90 million in grants) (Figure 5). At 
present, the programme for Ukraine represents the second largest MFA programme ever 
decided, with €500 million on top of the €110 million remaining undisbursed from the 2002 
MFA programme (thus summing to €610 million). During the first semester of 2011, no loan 
disbursements took place.  BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF EU INSTRUMENTS FOR MACRO-FINANCIAL STABILITY | 17 
Figure 4. MFA disbursed from 1999 to 2010 
 
Note: € million 
Source: European Commission, DG ECFIN. 
Figure 5. MFA regional distribution over the period 1990-2010 
 
 
Source: European Commission, DG ECFIN. 
1.2  Macro-financial instruments of the euro area member states 
In addition to the MFS facilities available at the EU level, euro area member states have 
decided  to  establish  other  instruments  intended  to  preserve  the  financial  stability  of  the 
entire euro area. These instruments have assumed a crucial role in recent years, since the 
debate at the political level about managing the sovereign debt crisis has primarily focused 
on defining the appropriate tools to deal with the increasing financial difficulties of euro area 
peripheral countries. There are currently three MFS instruments designed for the euro area: 
  the Greek Loan Facility (GLS), set up as first response by the euro area to the financial 
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  the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which currently represents the largest 
financial  assistance  fund  existing  at  the  European  level  to  deal  with  the  financial 
difficulties of member states; and 
  the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which is intended to replace the role of the 
EFSF by July 2012 and act as a permanent financial mechanism to assure euro area 
stability.  
1.2.1  Greek Loan Facility 
Key Findings 
  On  2  May  2010,  the  Heads  of  State  and  Government  of  the  EU  member  states 
approved an assistance package providing funds, together with the IMF, of up to 
€110 billion for a three-year adjustment programme (until June 2013).  
  This purely intergovernmental system clearly represented an interim solution before 
the establishment of more structured (EFSF) or permanent (ESM) mechanisms.  
  Under the GLF, the Commission has not acted as a borrower on behalf of the EU (as it 
does under the EFSM or BoP facility), but the Commission has been entrusted by the 
euro area member states with coordinating and administering the disbursement to 
Greece. For this reason, the Hellenic Republic and the Commission signed an MoU 
agreeing on a programme to correct fiscal and external imbalances. 
 
Facing a dramatic rise in risk premiums on its government bonds, and increasingly aware 
that  with  a  public  deficit  out  of  control  its  ability  to  refinance  its  financial  needs  on  the 
capital markets would become impossible at sustainable interest rates, at the end of April 
2010 Greece formally requested international financial assistance. On 2 May 2010, the Heads 
of State and Government of the EU member states approved the Greek Loan Facility (GLS) 
an assistance package providing funds, together with the IMF, of up to €110 billion for a 
three-year adjustment programme (until June 2013). Under this programme, the other 16 
euro area countries provided up to €80 billion through pooled bilateral loans, coordinated 
and  administrated  by  the  European  Commission,  in  liaison  with  the  ECB.  This  purely 
intergovernmental system clearly represented an interim solution before the establishment of 
more structured (EFSF) or permanent (ESM) mechanisms.  
Under the GLF, the Commission has not acted as a borrower on behalf of the EU (as it does 
under the EFSM or BoP facility), but the Commission has been entrusted by the euro area 
member states with coordinating and administering the disbursement to Greece. For this 
reason, the Hellenic Republic and the Commission signed an MoU agreeing on a programme 
to  correct  fiscal  and  external  imbalances.  The  release  of  the  tranches  has  been  based  on 
observance  of  quantitative  performance  criteria  defined  by  the  Commission  and  on  its 
positive evaluation of progress made by Greece (in the same way described in section 1.1.2 
for the EFSM). Moreover the tasks of the Commission comprise, on behalf and under the 
instruction of the euro area member states providing the support, the opening of an account 
in the name of the Lenders with the ECB, and the use of that account for processing of all 
payments on behalf of the Lenders and from the Borrower, the co-ordination of the process 
for disbursements, certain calculations, distribution amongst Lenders of payments and the 
provision of information to Lenders regarding breaches of the Loan Facility Agreement or 
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As the first Greek programme did not achieve its objectives, on 14 March 2012 euro area 
finance  ministers  approved  financing  of  a  second  economic  adjustment  programme  for 
Greece, up to €130 billion until 2014, of which €102 billion is managed under the EFSF and 
€28 billion is provided by the IMF. Since the undisbursed tranches of the GLF are to be 
released by the EFSF, the last disbursement made in December 2011 could be considered the 
last activity of this mechanism, excluding the repayment by Greece of the already disbursed 
tranches scheduled to start in 2014.  
1.2.2  European Financial Stability Facility 
Key Findings 
  Launched  in May  2010,  its main  goal  is  to  provide  funds  to  distressed  euro area 
member states at lower interest rates than those otherwise available to them. The 
EFSF  is  a  société  anonyme  incorporated  in  Luxembourg.  It  is  structured  as  a 
temporary,  credit-enhanced,  special  purpose  vehicle  with  minimal  capitalisation, 
which has been created to raise funds from the capital markets on its investment 
grade rating. 
  Since the EFSF is a private company, it does not entail any formal active participation 
by the EU institutions, even if the Commission and the ECB each have observers on 
the EFSF board, and the latter is headed by the chairman of the ECOFIN.  
  Although the main objective of the EFSF instrument is to provide financial assistance 
through direct loans to member states in financial trouble, it could provide assistance 
to euro area countries through the use of other, more flexible financial instruments: 
precautionary programmes, financing the recapitalisation of financial institutions and 
intervention in the secondary markets to avoid contagion. 
  The EFSF, acting as a private company, issues bonds backed by guarantees given by 
the 17 euro area member states. Initially the EFSF was set up with only €440 billion of 
guarantees given by its members, then on 24 June 2011, the European Council agreed 
to  increase  the  maximum  guarantee  commitments  to  €780  billion,  resulting  in  an 
effective lending capacity of €440 billion. 
  On 26 October 2011, Heads of State and Government of euro area member states 
decided to maximise the capacity of the EFSF, in order to build a more solid firewall 
against financial speculation and to try in this way to prevent any possible contagion 
effect  of  the  crisis:  the  Sovereign,  partial  risk  participation  (offering  partial  risk 
protection to investors buying the newly issued bonds of a member state) and the Co-
investment  fund  (entailing  the  establishment  of  one  or  more  special  purpose 
vehicles). 
  Like the EFSM, the EFSF currently finances two ad hoc assistance programmes – for 
Ireland (€17.7 billion) and Portugal (€26 billion) – resulting in a total lending activity 
of €40.2 billion. In addition, at a meeting on 26 October 2011, euro area Heads of State 
and Government agreed to a second financial assistance programme for Greece (€180 
billion). 
In  addition  to  the  resources  managed  at  the  EU  level  through  the  EFSM,  the  euro  area 
member states decided to provide additional funds to euro area countries in trouble through 
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provide  funds  to  distressed  euro  area  member  states  at  lower  interest  rates  than  those 
otherwise available to them. Moreover, on 21 July 2011 the Heads of State and Government 
of  the  euro  area  agreed  to  further  increase  the  EFSF’s  scope  of  activity,  introducing  the 
possibility to activate a precautionary programme, finance the recapitalisation of financial 
institutions and intervene in the secondary markets to avoid contagion. 
Institutional framework.  The  EFSF  is  a  société anonyme  incorporated  in  Luxembourg.  It  is 
structured  as  a  temporary,  credit-enhanced,  special  purpose  vehicle  with  minimal 
capitalisation,  which  has  been  created  to  raise  funds  from  the  capital  markets  on  its 
investment  grade  rating  (Olivares-Caminal,  2011)..  The  establishment  of  this  private 
company was agreed by the euro area member states on 9 May 2010, with the signing of the 
EFSF Framework Agreement and it was incorporated in Luxembourg under Luxembourgish 
law on 7 June 2010. Moreover, on 21 July 2011 a new Amended EFSF Framework Agreement 
was signed, enlarging the Fund’s activity without changing its institutional structure (EFSF, 
2011b).  
The EFSF is a very small organisation, and its staff is composed of around 25 persons. Its 
operability is possible thanks to the German Debt Management Office (front and back office) 
and the EIB, which provide support for its activities. At the moment, the Chief Executive 
Officer  is  Klaus  Regling  (the  former  Director  General  of  the  European  Commission’s 
Directorate-General  for  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs),  while  the  Board  of  the  EFSF  is 
composed  of  high-level  representatives  of  the  17  euro  area  member  states  (i.e.  deputy 
ministers or secretaries of state or director generals of national treasuries). Each participating 
member state can apply to be represented by a Director, subject to the approval of other 
member states, which may also decide on the removal of any one of the elected Directors. 
The  board  also  has  to  decide  on  its  representative  at  the  EWG,  in  order  to  ensure  close 
coordination  between  EFSF  and  the  Eurogroup.  The  voting  mechanism  reflects  the 
participation of the states, i.e. each Director’s vote is commensurate with the contribution 
key  for  the  EFSF  capital.  As  regards  the  voting  and  majorities,  the  agreement  requires 
unanimity  for  all  crucial  decisions,  e.g.  the  assignment  of  a  loan,  approval  of  an  MoU, 
increases in authorised and/or issued and paid-up share capital (EFSF, 2011a). A qualified 
majority,  representing  no  less  than  two-thirds  of  the  total  guaranteed  commitments,  is 
applied to those procedures that are not specified in the list of decisions by consensus, e.g. 
the EFSF disbursements related to a programme already approved, operational aspects of 
debt issuance and details about the application of alternative strategies for funding. Since the 
EFSF  is  a private  company,  it  does  not  entail  any  formal  active  participation  by  the  EU 
institutions, even if the Commission and the ECB each have observers on the EFSF board, 
and the latter is headed by the chairman of the ECOFIN.  
EFSF financial assistance is released after an official request is made by a euro area member 
state to the other euro area member states. Then the EWG has to inform the Council, which 
charges  the  Commission  in  liaison  with  the  ECB  and  the  IMF  to  undertake  a  rigorous 
analysis of the sustainability of the public debt of the member state, assessing its financing 
needs. On this basis, the Commission negotiates (always jointly with the IMF and the ECB), a 
macro-economic adjustment programme and drafts it in the MoU. The MoU, together with 
the main terms and conditions of the loan facility agreement, is proposed by the Commission 
to the Council. Then the EFSF board, following endorsement by the Council, decides on the 
granting of financial assistance and the terms and conditions under which it is provided. 
Once the programme is approved by the Council, the Commission signs the MoU with the 
member state on behalf of the euro area members. During the assistance programme, the 
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reporting directly to the Council and to the EFSF Board of Governors, which decide on the 
disbursement of the new tranches of the loan. 
Additional  financing  activities.  Although  the  main  objective  of  the  EFSF  instrument  is  to 
provide financial assistance through direct loans to member states in financial trouble (the 
same kind of programme as the EFSM, the BoP and the IMF), on 21 July 2011 the Heads of 
State and Government of the euro area member states decided to enlarge the scope of the 
EFSF. Their aim was to provide assistance to euro area countries through the use of other, 
more flexible financial instruments. Thus, at the moment the EFSF can 
  activate precautionary programmes. The objective of this instrument is to intervene before 
member states face difficulties in raising funds in the capital markets, thus preventing 
crisis  situations.  Once  the  precautionary  assistance  has  been  activated,  the member 
state is not deemed a ‘programme country’ (thus trying to avoid negative financial 
market effects stemming from such a reputation) and the EFSF gives a preferential 
credit  line  to  overcome  an  external  temporary  shock  and  cover  the member state’s 
financial needs. This liquidity facility can be released in three forms:  
i)  the Precautionary Conditioned Credit Line (PCCL), drawn as a loan or primary 
market  purchase,  is  given  only  to  member  states  that  present  fundamentally 
sound  economic  and  financial  conditions  and  is  based  on  pre-established 
conditions  that  the  beneficiary  remains  committed  to  maintaining  sound  and 
credible policies in the future;  
ii)  the Enhanced Conditions Credit Line (ECCL), which works like the PCCL but is 
reserved for member states that have worse economic and financial conditions 
and  thus  have  to  adopt  (in  accordance  with  the  Commission  and  the  ECB) 
corrective measures; and  
iii)  the  Enhanced  Conditions  Credit  Line  with  Sovereign  Partial  Risk  Protection 
(ECCL+), which additionally offers sovereign, partial risk protection to primary 
bonds.  Indeed,  the  EFSF  provides  a  certificate  to  the  holder,  offering  a  fixed 
amount of credit protection equal to a percentage of the principal amount of the 
sovereign bond issued by the assisted member state. 
  intervene in the primary and secondary markets. As part of a standard or a precautionary 
programme,  the  EFSF  can  intervene  in  the  primary  (and/or  secondary)  market  to 
maintain or restore access to the financial market of the assisted member state(s). While 
the unique limitations in the event of primary market intervention are the conditions 
listed in the MoU and the purchase limit of 50% of the final amount issued under the 
assistance,  in  the  case  of  secondary  market  intervention,  the  procedure  is  more 
complex.  That  is  because the  ECB  acts  in  the market  on  behalf  of  the  EFSF  and  it 
requires  around  two  to  three  days. For  activation,  the  process starts  with a  formal 
request  from  a  member  state  to  the  Eurogroup  president  (although  in  exceptional 
circumstances,  the  ECB  could  issue  an  early  warning  to  the  Eurogroup  Working 
Group). Then the ECB has to draft a specific report containing the risks to euro area 
stability  related  to  the  financial  difficulties  of  the  member  states  and  assessing  the 
financial needs for EFSF intervention.  
  finance the recapitalisation of financial institutions. This intervention is reserved solely for 
non-assisted  member  states,  since  a  standard  EFSF  assistance  programme  already 
covers the needs of the country’s financial sector. The declared objective is to limit 
contagion of financial stress by ensuring the capacity of a government to finance the 
recapitalisation of financial institutions at sustainable borrowing costs, thanks to the 
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EFSF  loans  to  the  member  states  are  on  the  basis  of  an  already  specified 
restructuring/resolution plan agreed at the national level between the member state 
and the private sector. The institutional procedures for the EFSF intervention are softer 
than a standard programme: the official request must be made by a member state to 
the  Eurogroup  Working  Group,  which  has  to  assess  the  request,  following  the 
independent  advice  given  by  the Commission  in  liaison  with  the  ECB,  and  (where 
appropriate) with the relevant European financial supervisory authorities.  
How the financial assistance functions. The EFSF, acting as a private company, issues bonds 
backed by guarantees given by the 17 euro area member states. Initially the EFSF was set up 
with  only  €440  billion  of  guarantees  given  by  its  members,  then  on  24  June  2011,  the 
European Council agreed to increase the maximum guarantee commitments to €780 billion, 
resulting  in  an  effective  lending  capacity  of  €440  billion  (due  to  the  165%  over-
collateralisation  requirement  to  keep  the  AAA  rating  on  its  issuances).  Still,  it  must  be 
recognised that owing to the current rating of the guarantors (especially according to S&P’s 
ratings), the effective lending capacity available under the EFSF is less than €440 billion; 
indeed, not all guarantees are taken into account for the purposes of rating the debt securities 
issued to secure a AAA rating (Olivares-Caminal, 2011). 
Table 5. EFSF contribution keys 











Austria  AA+/Aaa/AAA  21,639  2.78  21,639  2.99 
Belgium  AA/Aa3/AA  27,032  3.47  27,032  3.72 
Cyprus  BB+/Ba1/BBB-  1,526  0.2  1,526  0.21 
Estonia  AA-/A1/A+  1,995  0.26  1,995  0.27 
Finland  AAA/Aaa/AAA  13,974  1.79  13,974  1.92 
France  AA+/Aaa/AAA  158,488  20.31  158,488  21.83 
Germany  AAA/Aaa/AAA  211,046  27.06  211,046  29.07 
Greece  SD/C/B-  21,898  2.81  -  0 
Ireland  BBB+/Ba1/BBB+  12,378  1.59  -  0 
Italy  BBB+/A3/A-  139,268  17.86  139,268  19.18 
Luxembourg  AAA/Aaa/AAA  1,947  0.25  1,947  0.27 
Malta  A-/A3/A+  704  0.09  704  0.1 
Netherlands  AAA/Aaa/AAA  44,446  5.7  44,446  6.12 
Portugal  BB/Ba3/BB+  19,507  2.5  -  0 
Slovakia  A/A2/A+  7,728  0.99  7,728  1.06 
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Spain  A/A3/A  92,544  11.87  92,544  12.75 
Total  779,783  100  726,000  100 
* S&P/Moodys/Fitch) 
** After the step out of Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
Note: As of April 2012 
Source: EFSF 
 
The percentage contribution key of the guarantees given by each member state is defined in 
accordance with their share of the paid-up capital at the ECB (Table 5). At the same time, the 
key percentages of the guarantees provided by the individual member states could vary 
among different bonds by reason of either a guarantor becoming a stepping-out guarantor or 
the introduction of a new member state to the euro area, i.e. the adherence of a new euro-
area member state to the EFSF. 
The stepping-out mechanism is a particular feature of the EFSF: in the event that a member 
state experiences severe financial difficulties and requests EFSF support (or benefits from 
financial  support  under  a  similar  programme),  it  may  ask  other  euro  area  members  to 
suspend its commitment to provide further guarantees to the EFSF’s new bond issuances 
(but the guarantees provided for previous loans are still valid). If the remaining guarantors 
(deciding unanimously through the EWG) agree to this request, then the country becomes a 
‘stepping-out guarantor’ and it is not asked to provide guarantees or incur any new EFSF 
loans.  Thus,  the  percentage  contribution  key  of  the  remaining  member  states  has  to  be 
adjusted  accordingly  for  the  issuance  of  the  new  liabilities  resulting  from  new  EFSF 
assistance programmes. When the EFSF was established, Greece already had the status of a 
stepping-out guarantor, while Ireland became a stepping-out guarantor on 3 December 2010 
and Portugal did so with effect from 16 May 2011.  
To raise the money required to facilitate or provide financial assistance, the EFSF is entitled 
to issue bonds or notes, commercial paper, debt securities or other financing arrangements 
backed by timely, unconditional, irrevocable and several guarantees given by the member 
states on a pro rata basis. The pricing structure for the loans is defined as the EFSF cost of 
funding plus the margin equal to 200 basis points before the third year of the loan (increased 
to 300 basis points in respect of any loan that remains outstanding). The debt instruments 
issued by the EFSF are designed to be serviced by the loan repayments that the EFSF expects 
to receive from the borrowers, implying a perfect match between repayments and scheduled 
payments. If a borrower fails to fulfil its obligations on time, funds have to be drawn first of 
all directly from the guarantees provided by the member states on a pro rata basis, then from 
a loan-specific cash buffer (its definition has not been revealed), and finally from the cash 
reserves set up during EFSF lending activity. 24 | CASALE, GIOVANNINI, GROS, IVAN, NÚÑEZ FERRER & PEIRCE 
 
Table 6. EFSF rating 
Agency  Rating  Comments 
Fitch Ratings  AAA/Stable 
  The increase in the EFSF's capacity is intended to be 
achieved without extending the underpinning guarantees. 
  The credit enhancement is provided by the 'over-guarantee' 
mechanism and cash reserves in place.* 
Moody’s  Aaa/Stable 
  No Aaa-rated country has lost its top-notch rating.  
  Aaa-rated guarantees are sufficient by themselves to cover 
all of the associated debt service.** 
Standard & Poor's 
AA+/negative 
outlook 
  The credit enhancements needed to offset the reduced 
creditworthiness of EFSF guarantors are not likely. 
  The outlook on the long-term rating for the EFSF is therefore 
being revised to negative from developing and affirming the 
'AA+/A-1+' ratings. 
  The negative outlook on the long-term rating mirrors the 
negative outlooks of France and Austria.** 
* As of October 2011, ** As of February 2012 
Source: European Commission, DG ECFIN. 
 
The EFSF has been assigned the best possible credit rating, according to the ECB’s list of 
eligible marketable assets. The main reason for this creditworthiness is that the guarantees 
from its AAA members are sufficient by themselves to cover all of the associated debt service 
if the supported countries do not honour their debt obligations. Moreover, the rating derives 
from the fact that the liquidity reserves invested in AAA-rated securities should additionally 
cover all of the potential liabilities of the EFSF (see Table 6).  
The Framework Agreement does not contain any maturity limitations for the loans or for the 
funding  instruments,  since  they  are  defined  on  a  case-by-case  basis  (EFSF,  2011a). 
Nevertheless, at the euro area summit on 21 July 2011, it was agreed that maturities would 
be extended to a minimum average of 15 years and up to 30 years (EFSF, 2011b). Moreover, 
in November 2011, a diversified funding strategy was introduced, creating (in addition to 
long-term bonds) a short-term bill programme: since the end of 2011, the EFSF has held 
regular auctions of three-month and six-month bills. This idiosyncrasy in the fundraising 
results  in  a  situation  whereby  the  funds  raised  are  no  longer  attributed  to  a  particular 
country  (Ireland  or  Portugal),  but  are  instead  pooled  and  then  disbursed  to  programme 
countries according to the disbursement plan agreed with each county during the definition 
of the assistance programme. To avoid inconvenience in the financial markets between the 
EFSM and the EFSF, the issuance calendar of the two is closely coordinated. This element is 
especially  important,  since  EFSF  investors  are  the  same  as  those  for  the  EFSM  (banks, 
pension funds, central banks, sovereign wealth funds, asset managers, insurance companies 
and private banks). Finally, it must be noted that the EFSF, owing to its private nature, does 
not operate as an international financial institution (like the IMF or the World Bank), so it 
does  not  have  any  kind  of  preferred  creditor  status  in  the  event  of  restructuring  debt 
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Instruments for maximising EFSF financing capacity. On 26 October 2011, Heads of State and 
Government of euro area member states decided to maximise the capacity of the EFSF, in 
order to build a more solid firewall against financial speculation and to try in this way to 
prevent  any  possible  contagion  effect  of  the  crisis.  Two  options  have  been  identified  to 
leverage EFSF resources, without increasing the guarantee commitments already given by 
the member states, but up to now neither of them has been used. The amount of additional 
resources available thanks to the use of the two options crucially depends on the precise 
structure of the new instruments and on the EFSF’s credibility in the market. Fundamental in 
this sense would be the market conditions and the soundness of the countries benefiting 
from  EFSF  support  facilities,  as  well  as  the  credit  rating  of  the  euro area  member states 
providing guarantees for the EFSF. Moreover, financing procedures under both options are 
strictly linked to the drafting of an MoU, in order to establish policy conditionality for EFSF 
intervention  and  appropriate  monitoring  and  oversight  procedures.  The  two  options 
currently available are the following: 
  Sovereign, partial risk participation. This option is intended to offer partial risk protection 
to  investors  buying  the  newly  issued  bonds  of  a  member  state.  The  EFSF  would 
provide  a  partial  protection  certificate  (separately  tradable),  which  could  give  the 
holder an amount of fixed credit protection of 20-30% of the principal amount of the 
sovereign bond. Thus, the EFSF certificate would only be effectively operative after a 
credit event (a default, restructuring or moratorium) and it would entitle the holder to 
claim against this loss in EFSF bonds. This option is primarily designed to be part of a 
precautionary  programme,  in  order  to  sustain  the  demand  for  the  new  issues  of  a 
member state and lower its interest rates. The member state must issue its sovereign 
bonds in line with its normal issuance process, but this process must take place in 
conjunction with the EFSF issuance at the same time (and with the same maturity) as 
the partial risk protection by a special purpose vehicle created ad hoc in Luxembourg, 
which would not be legally connected to the EFSF or member states. 
  Co-investment fund (CIF). This option entails the establishment of one or more special 
purpose vehicles. Each CIF is intended to facilitate the funding of a member state and 
support  its  sovereign  bonds  in  the  primary  or  secondary  markets  (or  both).  This 
vehicle could be established using a combination of public and private funds, to enable 
the  enlargement  of  the  resources  available  for  the  EFSF’s  financial  assistance 
instruments.  The  CIF  must  be  established  with  a  predefined  lifetime.  From  an 
institutional point of view, it would appear as a subsidiary of the EFSF, domiciled in 
Luxembourg, and its Board of Directors would be appointed by the EFSF. Its structural 
design is intended to attract a wide range of investors (risk capital investors, sovereign 
wealth funds and the IMF) thanks to the creation of three layers: a first-loss tranche, a 
participating tranche and potentially a third layer of a rated, senior debt tranche that 
would satisfy every investor’s risk profile. 26 | CASALE, GIOVANNINI, GROS, IVAN, NÚÑEZ FERRER & PEIRCE 
 
Table 7. EFSF assistance programmes 
Country  Agreed 
amount 




Ireland  17.7  12  2010-13 
IMF, EFSM and bilateral loans 
by the UK, Denmark & 
Sweden 
Portugal  26  9.6  2011-14  IMF and EFSM 
Greece II  179.6  103.7  2011-15  IMF 
Remainder for utilisation: 216.7 
Note: As of May 2012, € billion 
Source: EFSF. 
 
Current level of utilisation. Like the EFSM, the EFSF currently finances two ad hoc assistance 
programmes  –  for  Ireland  (€17.7  billion)  and  Portugal  (€26  billion)  –  resulting  in  a  total 
lending  activity  of  €43.7  billion.  As  of  May  2012,  around  50%  of  the  funds  had  been 
disbursed  to  the  two  countries,  with  a  current average maturity  of  around  ten  years  for 
Ireland and six years for Portugal (Table 7).  
In addition, at the meeting of 26 October 2011, euro area Heads of State and Government 
agreed to a second financial assistance programme for Greece: the details of this programme 
were agreed by the Eurogroup on 21 February 2012, which decided to use the EFSF as a 
vehicle for the second round of Greek loans, totalling €180 billion. The EFSF must not only 
manage the undisbursed tranches of the GLF (€61 billion, of which €9.2 billion has already 
been  disbursed),  but  also  provide  additional  funds  for  banking  sector  recapitalisation  in 
Greece  (€48  billion,  of  which  €25  billion  has  already  been  disbursed)  and  undertake  the 
following other actions: 
  refinance  private  sector  involvement.  The  EFSF has  to  provide  its  bonds  to holders  of 
bonds  under  Greek  law  as  part  of  the  voluntary  debt  exchange.  These  short-term 
bonds (one and two years) will subsequently be rolled over into longer maturities up 
to a total amount of €30 billion (of which €29.7 billion had already been disbursed as of 
May 2012); 
  finance accrued interest. To enable Greece to repay accrued interest on its outstanding 
sovereign  bonds,  during  the  refinancing  of  private  sector  involvement  Greece  has 
given  investors  EFSF  six-month  bills,  which  will  be  subsequently  rolled  over  into 
longer maturities. The amount of accrued interest could increase up to €5.5 billion (of 
which €4.82 billion has already been disbursed as of May 2012); and 
  buy  back  the  Eurosystem  bonds.  To  buy  back  from  the  Eurosystem  National  Central 
Banks  those  bonds  issued  or  guaranteed  by  Greece  (which  are  held  by  NCBs  as 
collateral for monetary policy operations by the Eurosystem), the EFSF has released to 
Greece €35 billion in 1-year bonds to be used in the debt exchange.  BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF EU INSTRUMENTS FOR MACRO-FINANCIAL STABILITY | 27 
1.2.3  European Stability Mechanism 
Key Findings 
  On  24  June  2011,  the  European  Council  established  a  permanent  crisis  resolution 
mechanism for the euro area, the ESM, with a planned lending capacity amounting to 
€500  billion.  It  is  established  as  an  intergovernmental  organisation  under  public 
international law and is based in Luxembourg. As a permanent mechanism, from 1 
July 2012, when it is planned to become operational, the ESM is expected to take over 
the  tasks  currently  fulfilled  by  the  EFSF  and  EFSM,  using  the  same  instruments 
currently available for the amended EFSF. 
  The ESM will enter into force as soon as member states representing 90% of capital 
commitments have ratified it – the common objective established by the Council is 
July 2012, a year earlier than originally planned in the first ESM Treaty.  
  The procedure to establish a country assistance programme is similar to that of the 
EFSF. Furthermore, according to the latest version of the ESM Treaty, the granting of 
financial assistance is conditional (as of 1 March 2013) on ratification by the member 
states of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union (aka the fiscal compact). 
  The  ESM  is  planned  to  become  operational  as  of  mid-2012  with  total  subscribed 
capital of €700 billion and an effective lending capacity of €500 billion. Of this €700 
billion, €80 billion is in the form of paid-in capital shares, while €620 billion is in 
callable shares; these amounts are split among euro area member states according to 
their capital contribution key in the ECB. 
  The paid-in capital shares of the ESM have been planned to be made available more 
quickly than initially foreseen in the first ESM Treaty: two tranches of capital are 
expected to be paid in 2012, a first one in July, a second one by October. Another two 
tranches are planned to be paid in 2013 and a final tranche in the first half of 2014. 
  While the EFSF (like the EFSM and the BoP facility) has the same credit right as any 
other  sovereign  claim,  the  ESM  –  owing  to  its  nature  as  an  intergovernmental 
organisation – is designed to have preferred creditor status in a similar way as the 
IMF, even if it accepts the preferred creditor status of the IMF over the ESM. 
  The ESM is designed to consolidate all the new assistance programmes in favour of 
euro area member states from July 2012. Yet since the €500 billion lending capacity is 
planned to be reached only in 2014, during the transition phase the EFSF may be 
engaged in new programmes to ensure an overall lending capacity of €500 billion. 
 
On 24 June 2011, the European Council established a permanent crisis resolution mechanism 
for the euro area, the ESM, with a planned lending capacity amounting to €500 billion. It is 
established  as  an  intergovernmental  organisation  under  public  international  law  and  is 
based in Luxembourg. As a permanent mechanism, from 1 July 2012, when it is planned to 
become operational, the ESM is expected to take over the tasks currently fulfilled by the 
EFSF and EFSM, using the same instruments currently available for the amended EFSF (see 
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  provide direct loans to countries in financial difficulty backed by issuing bonds or other 
debt instruments in the international financial markets; 
  intervene in the debt primary and secondary markets to increase the liquidity of a member 
state in the sovereign bond market and maintain or restore its access to the financial 
market; 
  establish a precautionary programme to provide assistance to a member state before the 
complete deterioration of its financial conditions; and 
  finance recapitalisations of national financial institutions through loans to member state 
governments that are not under a standard assistance programme.  
Institutional framework. The first step in establishing the ESM took place on 25 March 2011, 
when  the  European  Council  adopted  a  decision  to  amend  the  TFEU,  adding  a  new 
paragraph  to  Art.  136:  “The Member  States  whose  currency  is  the  euro  may  establish  a 
stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area 
as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be 
made subject to strict conditionality.” 
To concretely enforce this Treaty provision, the euro area member states have signed the 
Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism, which has actually been signed twice, 
in  order  to  include  the  new  instruments  agreed  for  the  amended  EFSF.  After  the  first 
signature on 11 July 2011, on 2 February 2012 the euro area member states decided to make 
the ESM more effective by signing a new treaty, including new financing tools, a direct link 
to the ‘fiscal compact’, a new emergency decision-making procedure and an alignment with 
IMF practices as regards private sector involvement. The ESM will enter into force as soon as 
member  states  representing  90%  of  capital  commitments  have  ratified  it  –  the  common 
objective established by the Council is July 2012, a year earlier than originally planned in the 
first ESM Treaty.  
The governing structure of the ESM is based on a Board of Governors composed of the 
ministers of finance of the euro area member states, along with the European Commissioner 
for  Economic  and  Monetary  Affairs  and  the  ECB  President  as  observers.  The  Board  of 
Governors appoints a Managing Director responsible for the day-to-day management of the 
ESM. The other main institutional body is the Board of Directors, chaired by the Managing 
Director and made up of one Director (and alternate Director) appointed by each euro area 
member  state.  The  most  important  decisions  are  taken  by  the  Board  of  Governors  with 
unanimity; the new Treaty signed in February 2012 provides for an emergency procedure 
whereby a decision to grant financial assistance can be taken by a qualified majority of 85% 
of the votes cast. Yet this emergency procedure can only be used when the Commission and 
the ECB both identify that the decision to grant or implement financial assistance involves a 
threat to the economic and financial sustainability of the entire euro area. 
Additionally,  the  ESM  Treaty  provides  the  possibility  for  non-euro  member  states  to 
participate in financial assistance programmes under the ESM for euro area member states. 
This mechanism must be established on an ad hoc basis; already Denmark, Sweden and the 
UK  are  involved  in  providing  bilateral  assistance  to  Ireland  to  complement  the 
EFSM/EFSF/IMF programme. In the case of joint financial assistance, the non-euro member 
states could participate in ESM meetings related to that specific programme and could access 
any  available  information  useful  for  monitoring  activities.  Moreover,  the  ESM  should 
support equivalent creditor status for those involved in bilateral lending alongside the ESM.  
The procedure to establish a country assistance programme is similar to that of the EFSF (see 
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version of the ESM Treaty, the granting of financial assistance is conditional (as of 1 March 
2013)  on  ratification  by  the  member  states  of  the  Treaty  on  Stability,  Coordination  and 
Governance  in  the  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (aka  ‘fiscal  compact’),  and  thus  on 
implementation of the balanced budget rule as specified in that Treaty within the agreed 
timeline. 
Figure 6. ESM Financial assistance approval procedure 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Financing activities. The ESM has been designed as a permanent instrument for the euro area 
to  mobilise  funding  and  provide  financial  assistance  to  its  member  states  that  are 
experiencing  or  are  threatened  by  severe  financing  problems,  in  order  to  safeguard  the 
financial stability of the euro area as a whole. To achieve this objective, the ESM is able to use 
the same range of instruments that have been put in place for the EFSF. In addition to the 
direct loans to beneficiary member states, the ESM could provide precautionary financial 
Formal request of financial 
assistance
• the request is made by a MS to the other 
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Assessment phase
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• the Council endorses the adjustment 
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assistance  and  loans  to  member  states  for  the  recapitalisation  of  financial  institutions; 
moreover, it would be able to purchase the sovereign bonds of beneficiary member states on 
the primary and secondary markets (see section 1.2.2 and Figure 7 for a detailed description).  
Figure 7. ESM financing activities 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
How the financial assistance functions. The ESM is planned to become operational as of mid-
2012 with total subscribed capital of €700 billion and an effective lending capacity of €500 
billion. Of this €700 billion, €80 billion is in the form of paid-in capital shares, while €620 
billion  is  in  callable  shares;  these  amounts  are  split  among  euro  area  member  states 
according  to  their  capital  contribution key  in  the  ECB  (see  Table  5).  Any new  euro area 
member  state  adopting  the  euro  will  become  an  ESM  member  with  full  rights  and 
obligations as of the entry into force of the decision of the Council taken in accordance with 
Art. 140(2) TFEU.  
The paid-in capital shares of the ESM have been planned to be made available more quickly 
than initially foreseen in the first ESM Treaty: two tranches of capital are expected to be paid 
in 2012, a first one in July, a second one by October. Another two tranches are planned to be 
paid in 2013 and a final tranche in the first half of 2014. In line with the ESM Treaty, the 
payment of the capital could be further accelerated during the transitory phase from 2013 to 
2014  if  needed  to  maintain  a  15%  ratio  between  the  paid-in  capital  and  the  outstanding 
amount of ESM issuances activated to assist member states. Furthermore, if an ESM member 
fails to provide the required payment following a capital call by the ESM, the missing capital 
should  be  covered  by  all  other  ESM  members;  thus,  this  system  ensures  that  the  ESM 
receives the total amount of paid-in capital needed. Finally, the euro area member states 
have decided to attribute to the ESM, as part of its paid-in capital, the financial sanctions 
applicable  under  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  and  the  macroeconomic  imbalance 
procedure.  
Even if a rating agency has already judged the ESM, it is intended to obtain and maintain the 
highest credit rating, owing its specific capital structure. Unlike the EFSF, the presence of the 
paid-in capital (in addition to the callable capital and guarantees) should ensure the AAA 
rating per se, without the presence of the credit enhancement schemes in the EFSF (over-
guarantee, cash buffer and cash reserve).  
While the EFSF (like the EFSM and the BoP facility) has the same credit right as any other 
sovereign claim, the ESM – owing to its nature as an intergovernmental organisation – is 
designed to have preferred creditor status in a similar way as the IMF, even if it accepts the 
preferred creditor status of the IMF over the ESM. 
Financial assistance by 
direct loans to MS
Precautionary assistance 
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Current  level  of  utilisation.  The  ESM  is  designed  to  consolidate  all  the  new  assistance 
programmes in favour of euro area member states from July 2012 (see Figure 8). Yet since the 
€500 billion lending capacity is planned to be reached only in 2014 (or even from mid-2013 in 
the case of an accelerated procedure), because of the delayed capital payments by member 
states, during the transition phase the EFSF may be engaged in new programmes to ensure 
an overall lending capacity of €500 billion. For this reason the overall ceiling for ESM/EFSF 
lending, as defined in the first version of the ESM Treaty, has been raised to €700 billion, 
such that the ESM and the EFSF will be able to operate jointly from mid-2013. After this date, 
the EFSF is expected to remain operational only in managing the already activated financing 
programmes,  thus  exercising  a  purely  administrative  function  until  it  has  received  full 
payment of its loans and it has repaid its liabilities. 












Source: authors’ elaboration on EFSF information.  
2.  Financial ImplicationS of the use of existing EU MFS instruments for 
the EU budget 
Key Findings 
BoP and EFSM 
  For the BoP and EFSM, the EU budget sets aside part of the EU budget’s margin 
between payment appropriations and the EU budget ceiling under a ‘token entry’. 
  The design of the two FMS mechanisms ensures that the risks are greatly minimised, 
so that the EU budget is exposed to a clearly ‘ring-fenced’ risk.  
  In case of a default of an assisted country, the Commission would initially draw on 
its cash reserves to service the debt provisionally and amend the yearly budget to 
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instruments  can be financed if called upon by the margin of the EU budget, between 
the payment appropriations and the own resources ceiling of EU budget. 
  Owing to the increasing activity, in the coming years the exposure from a default risk 
is expected to increase for the EU budget, even if not in a constant way. The spread of 
the maturity dates ensures that the yearly exposure of the budget remains limited, 
but in some years maturity dates have accumulated. 
  Potential risk is inherently linked to the future evolution of the MFF, since most of the 
repayments fall beyond the present MFF and even beyond the next one.  
MFA 
  The amounts of the financial assistance provided in grants under the MFA must be 
consistent with the budget appropriations established in the MFF. In addition, each 
year, the budgetary authority has to authorise the yearly appropriations. 
  The risks linked to MFA assistance are similar to those under the BoP facility and the 
EFSM; however, the risks of a non-repayment of the MFA provided in the form of 
loans appear higher under this MFS instrument, because the assisted countries are 
not EU member states. 
  To address the possible adverse implications of non-repayment of the loan, the MFA 
uses as a guarantee for its loan operations the Guarantee Fund for external actions, 
which provides guarantees to external loans by the EIB, Euratom and MFA. 
National Budgets 
  The  borrowings  undertaken  under  the  three  EU  MFS  instruments  are  direct  and 
unconditional obligations of the EU but are guaranteed by the 27 EU member states, 
which  are  legally  obliged  by  the  TFEU  to  provide  funds  to  meet  all  of  the  EU’s 
obligations. Thus in the case of a default of an assisted country, the EU member states 
have  to  step  in  and  cover  all  the  possible  losses  not  already  covered  by  the  EU 
internal mechanisms. 
  In  case  of  combined  default  on  their  outstanding  official  debts  of  the  countries 
currently assisted by the euro area MFS instruments, the resources involved would 
seriously endanger the public finances of euro area member states.  
The spread of EU financial assistance mechanisms and the introduction MFS instruments 
backed by the EU budget give rise to financial and governance concerns. The EU budget is a 
small financial instrument in relative terms, with inflexible rules and very narrow margins 
There are two kinds of operations from which there may be financial repercussions for the 
EU budget: i) operations for which a predetermined budget line is set aside to guarantee the 
risk; and ii) assistance that does not have a predetermined budget allocation in the financial 
framework, thus requiring the budget, in the event of a default, to raise additional funds to 
cover sums.  
In the latter category we find the BoP facility and the EFSM, while the other instrument, the 
MFA, has a special budget allocation (the Guarantee Fund for external actions), which is 
expressly designed to prevent the budget from being liable beyond the funding allocated for 
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The  first  category  of  MFS  instrument  (i.e.  the  BoP  facility  and  the  EFSM)  is  particularly 
important, as its potential impact on budget stability is not fully understandable from budget 
analysis. Moreover, the guarantees offered by the budget are relevant: the BoP facility can 
offer loans fully guaranteed by the budget to the level of €50 billion and the EFSM up to €60 
billion. In the recent public hearing of the Committee on Budgetary Control on 24 April 
2012,
21 the European Parliament indicated its concern about the risks and liabilities linked to 
these two instruments. For this reason, this section intends to offer a clearer picture of the 
issue. 
2.1  How the MFS instruments are recorded in the budget 
For the BoP and EFSM, the EU budget sets aside part of the EU budget’s margin between 
payment appropriations and the EU budget ceiling under a ‘token entry’ or pour memoria. 
The  budget  lines  for  the  BoP,  EFSM  and  MFA  loans  are  listed  under  heading  01  04  01 
(“European Community Guarantees for lending operations and for EIB lending operations”): 
  01  04  01  01  –  European  Union  guarantee  for  Union  borrowings  for  Balance-of-
Payments support; 
  01 04 01 03 – European Union guarantee for Union borrowings for financial assistance 
under the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism; and 
  01 04 01 04 – European Union guarantee for Union borrowings for Macro-Financial 
Assistance to third countries. 
In each line, the references to the basic act, the volumes of the operation and the duration are 
to be included. Moreover, budget line 01 04 01 14 shows the sum of the “Provisioning of the 
Guarantee  Fund”  for  all  Union  and  Euratom  borrowing  operations  and  for  EIB  lending 
operations.  
For the MFA, the risk exposure is recorded as part of the EU budget expenditures in the 
Guarantee Fund for external actions (as a safety net), which is also used to guarantee loans 
by the EIB to third countries. The amounts of the financial assistance provided in grants 
under the MFA must be consistent with the budget appropriations established in the multi-
annual financial framework (MFF), in accordance with Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 
480/2009 of 25 May 2009 on the Guarantee Fund for external actions
22. In addition, each 
year,  the  budgetary  authority  has  to  authorise  the  yearly  appropriations,  in  order  to  be 
consistent  with  the  ceilings  established  for  the  relevant  budget  appropriations  in  the 
multiannual  financial  framework.  Table  8  shows  the  estimated  impact  on  expenditure 
foreseen by the Commission for MFA grants, summarised in the budget line 01 03 02. 
Table 8. Commitments in macroeconomic assistance grants 
2011  2012  2013 
104,869  104,900  137,436 
Note: Operational commitment appropriations (grants) 
Source: European Commission. 
                                                   
21  Public  Hearing,  Committee  on  Budgetary  Control,  Tuesday  24.4.2012,  Budgetary  control  of  the 
EFSF/EFSM/ESM, Chairman Michael Theurer, rapporteur Iliana Ivanova. 
22 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 480/2009 of 25 May 2009 establishing the Guarantee Fund for 
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Finally, budget lines 800 for BoP and 802 for ESFM have been created on the revenue side to 
account for any potential reimbursements after an initial default or for any other revenue 
arising in connection with the guarantee provided by the EU budget.  
2.2  Risks to which the EU budget is exposed by the EFSM and BoP facilities 
The  exposure  to  risk  of  the  EU  budget  by  the  guarantees  it  extends  in  different  forms, 
including MFS assistance, is presented by the European Commission’s Working Document 
on guarantees covered by the EU budget (European Commission, 2011c). More generally, the 
risks  that  the  lending  and  borrowing  operations  can  pose  are  market  or  currency  risks, 
interest rate risks, credit risk and liquidity risk (summarised in Table 9 at the end of this 
section). The design of the EFSM and BoP mechanisms ensures that the risks are greatly 
minimised, so that the EU budget is exposed to a clearly ‘ring-fenced’ risk. 
Market risk. Under the BoP facility and the EFSM, assistance is provided in euros and thus 
cannot be affected by exchange rate fluctuations, leaving the market risk to be borne in full 
by the country benefitting from the assistance. This element concerns in particular the BoP 
facility, which assists EU countries that are not part of the euro area, but it could also concern 
the EFSM, since a euro area member state could be forced to leave the monetary union while 
the provision of financial assistance is still active.  
Interest  rate  risk.  Under  these  two  MFS  instruments,  the  terms  of  repayment  for  the 
beneficiary country are determined back-to-back, mirroring the requirements of the bonds 
issued or any form of loan raised, including any management costs or interest. These will be 
designed to cover the exact same terms on which the ESFM or BoP instruments have raised 
the funding from the capital markets through the bond issuances, thus limiting the interest 
rate risk. Under these two instruments the EU has significant interest-bearing assets and 
liabilities, but once the Commission has disbursed the assistance, the exact potential liability 
and time of the potential risk occurring can be estimated (the final interest rates may vary). 
The back-to back operation is described  in Figure 9. In this way the EU budget thus, in 
principle, never de facto has to be called upon to cover unforeseen events in addition to an 
actual default of the member states in its commitments.  
Credit risk. This represents the most important risk, and a risk that the EU budget has to bear 
under the budget ceiling of 1.23% of GNI. Theoretically, if the repayment commitment is 
large enough, there is a risk that the margin between payment appropriations and the EU 
budget ceiling will become too small. Given the large margin in the budget until 2013 and 
the expected large margins from 2014 to 2020, the probability of the margin being too limited 
appears  practically  inexistent.  Of  course,  a  fall  in  EU  GNI  combined  with  unexpected 
increases in payment appropriations could in theory have an effect, given that the margin is 
just a fraction of 1% of GNI. The credit risk from 2020 onwards is hard to estimate, as at 
present the budget size in future MFFs cannot be foreseen.  BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF EU INSTRUMENTS FOR MACRO-FINANCIAL STABILITY | 35 
Figure 9. A back-to-back loan operation 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Liquidity  risk.  In  addition  to  the  general  back-to-back  structure  of  the  loans  and  the 
subsequent schedule of the liquidity management, the regulations for both MFS instruments 
ensure that beneficiaries are expected to repay their loan 14 days in advance of the date the 
European  Commission  has  to  pay  the  sums  to  creditors,  thus  securing  the  liquidity 
management. 
According  to  Council  Regulation  No.  1150/2000  of  22  May  2000
23  on  the  system  of  the 
European  Communities  own  resources,  in  case  of  a  default  of  an  assisted  country,  the 
Commission would initially draw on its cash reserves to service the debt provisionally and 
amend the yearly budget to incorporate the refinancing need. In this way, these budget lines 
can  be  financed  if  called  upon  by  the  margin  of  the  EU  budget,  between  the  payment 
appropriations  and  the  own  resources  ceiling  of  EU  budget.  This  ensures  a  de  facto 
commitment  by  all  member  states  to  cover  this  amount  in  the  event  of  a  default  by  the 
assisted  country,  as  the  member  states  are  obliged  by  the  TFEU  to  provide  the  funds 
necessary to meet all of the EU’s obligations (Arts. 310 and 323 TFEU). 
                                                   
23 Council Regulation No. 1150/2000 of 22 May 2000 on the system of the European Communities own 
resources, OJ L 130, 31.5.2000. 
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Table 9. Summary of risks for the EU budget under the EFSM and the BoP facility 
Type of risk 
Description of 
the risk 
EU budget implications 
under the BOP and the 
EFSM 
Description of the 
implications 





Borne by the 
beneficiary as loans 





Change in the 










from a borrower 




Given the large 
margin in the coming 
years, the EU budget 












Beneficiaries have to 
repay their loans 14 
days in advance of 
the date the 
European 
Commission has to 
pay the sums to 
creditors 
Low 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
2.3  Assessing the annual risk exposure of the budget from the BoP and EFSM 
Transparency  and  oversight  of  the  operations  conducted  under  the  BoP  facility  and  the 
EFSM  is guaranteed under  very similar  procedures  and  are  presented  in  the section  3.1. 
More difficult is understanding how the budget is actually expected to cover outstanding 
liabilities in the coming years. Under these two MFS instruments, the Commission contracts 
borrowings  in  the  financial  markets  on  behalf  of  the  European  Union  and  the  amounts 
borrowed and the interest create de facto a financial risk for the EU budget. Given the small 
size of the budget, the potential total borrowing capacity of the instruments of €110 billion is 
far  from  negligible.  It  is  thus  crucial  to  assess  the  evolution  of  the  risks  entailed  in  the 
operations for the EU budget, gather a full picture of the financial liabilities of the EU budget 
and discuss the consequences of the potential defaults of large liabilities. 
The evolution of risks under the BoP facility and the EFSM is expected to correspond to the 
annual  repayment  schedule  under  the  financial  instruments  guaranteed  by  the  budget 
(including interest on loans). This risk is designed to be covered by the EU budget’s available 
margin under the EU budget ceiling of 1.23% of GNI. 
Before turning to assess the yearly exposure of the EU budget over the coming years, two 
points are important to better understanding the evolution of the risk exposure:  
  despite the fact that the lending activity has increased in recent years (see section 1.1), 
yearly risk exposure is in any case limited due to the spread of the reimbursement 
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  the  EFSM  is  approaching  the  limit  of  funding  it  is  allowed  to  commit  in  giving 
assistance  to  euro  area member states. With  the  activation  of  the  ESM,  it  is  highly 
improbable that this MFS instrument will be used for new assistance programmes. The 
same conclusion could not be drawn for the BoP assistance. 
Figure 10 shows the risk exposure calculated based on the outstanding loan amounts per 
year including the interest costs (nominal amounts with estimated interest costs based on 
initial  terms).  It  does  not  incorporate,  however,  those  amounts  that  have  already  been 
committed, but not yet disbursed (around €10 billion, see section 1.1). It appears that owing 
to the increasing activity of the two MFS instruments, in the coming years the exposure from 
a default risk is expected to increase for the EU budget, even if not in a constant way during 
the period considered (2014-41).  
Figure 10. Risk exposure of the budget based on bond maturity date and interest rate 
 
Note: € billion 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on European Commission and information by DG ECFIN. 
 
The spread of the maturity dates ensures that the yearly exposure of the budget remains 
limited, but in some years maturity dates have accumulated, in particular for 2015 and 2021. 
Even if the exposure may seem particularly high, this does not necessarily mean that these 
amounts represent a serious and severe risk for the EU budget. Indeed, the potential risk (i.e. 
the possibility for the EU budget to be unable to cover potential losses with the margin) is 
inherently linked to the future evolution of the multiannual financial framework, since most 
of the repayments fall beyond the present MFF and even beyond the next one. Still, at the 
moment there is no way to say what the needs will be in the future MFFs. For the 2014-20 
MFF,  the  margins  available  between  the  payment  appropriations  and  the  own  resources 
ceiling are estimated to be over 0.2% of GNI for most years, except for 2015 with 0.18% 0.18% 
(based  on  the  European  Commission’s  MFF  proposal;  European  Commission  2011g).  At 
current prices, in 2015 this would amount to a margin of approximately €30 billion, well 
above the risk of €9 billion. Based on these estimations, it appears that there is no significant 
risk to the budget over the next MFF in terms of an over-restrictive margin.  38 | CASALE, GIOVANNINI, GROS, IVAN, NÚÑEZ FERRER & PEIRCE 
 
Nevertheless,  care  should  be  taken  to  avoid  accumulating  bond  maturities  for  the  same 
years. In 2021, for example, there is again a spike of commitments, at nearly €11.5 billion. For 
that period there is no MFF programme to estimate the available margins, but imagining a 
situation in which the EU faces particularly important challenges and where an agreement 
for  a  new  MFF  allowed  a  substantial  increase  in  payment  appropriations,  such  a  token 
budget  entry  could  be  limiting  in  practice  unless  the  ceiling  of  own  resources  is  also 
increased. It is too early to speculate on a post-2020 MFF, but history has not been kind to the 
EU budget ceilings. 
2.4  Assessing the risk exposure from the MFA facility 
The MFA offers two types of support – grants in the form direct assistance to the country 
requesting  assistance  and  loans.  The  granting  of  MFA  assistance  has  fluctuated  over  the 
years  and  it  peaked  in  2010:  between  2001  and  2011  the  loan  component  of  the  MFA 
disbursed reached €1.1 billion, while MFA grants disbursed amounted to €2.1 billion (see 
Figure 11). To assess the risk exposure resulting from the use of this MFS instrument, we find 
it better to concentrate only on the loans, as they create future liabilities and risks for the EU 
budget. 
Figure 11. MFA amounts authorised by year during 2001-11 
 
Note: € million 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on European Commission (2011b) and information by DG ECFIN. 
 
The risks linked to MFA assistance are similar to those under the BoP facility and the EFSM 
described  in  the  previous  section;  however,  the  risks  of  a  non-repayment  of  the  MFA 
provided in the form of loans appear higher under this MFS instrument, because the assisted 
countries are not EU member states. Although the macroeconomic adjustment and reform 
programme agreed in the MoU and the oversight also provided by the IMF are expected to 
mitigate these risks, the prospects of a default by the beneficiaries appear more likely under 
this instrument.  
To address the possible adverse implications of non-repayment of the loan, the MFA uses as 
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guarantees to external loans by the EIB, Euratom and MFA. This is summarised in budget 
line 01 04 01 14, and is provisioned at a rate of 9% of the outstanding amount. 
The guarantees are designed to cover due repayment and interest, based on a back-to-back 
agreement with the beneficiary countries that mirrors the commitments of the EU towards its 
borrowings. The overall costs and risks of the MFA are low compared with the other MFS 
instruments, as the amount of assistance is much lower.  
Unfortunately, with the available information released by the Commission it is very difficult 
to gather figures on the yearly risk the MFA poses for the budget. But considering that the 
MFA represents just a fraction of the Guarantee Fund for external actions (in budget line 01 
04 01 14), some conclusions could be drawn. Figure 12 shows the level of the risk borne by 
the MFA compared with the whole guarantee line. The figures do not take into account new 
commitments  since  2010,  as  it  has  not  been  possible  to  obtain  data  on  the  repayment 
schedules from the Commission. Still, the results show that the risks posed for the EU budget 
by the MFA instruments are rather small in the coming years.  
Figure 12. Total annual risk borne by the budget related to third countries for the period 2011-16 
 
Note: € million  
Source: European Commission (2011c). 
 
While  it  is  expected  that  the  EFSM  will  be  used  less  often  as an MFS  instrument  in  the 
coming years, the same conclusion cannot be drawn for the MFA. The number and scale of 
operations conducted under this mechanism are determined by the frequency and severity of 
economic and financial crises outside the EU, and the global economic conditions at present 
do  not  appear  so  bright.  The  Commission  has  nonetheless  estimated  that  the  MFA  is 
expected to remain consistent with the current financial perspectives covering the period 
2007-13 and the budgetary appropriations foreseen therein (European Commission, 2010). 
2.5  The political issue of financing defaults at EU level 
The analysis contained in the previous sections shows there is little risk that the stability of 
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repayment schedules. It is clear, however, that in particular for the EFSM, the EU budget 
perhaps does not represent the most appropriate instrument to operate as a guarantee for 
large  assistance  programmes  to  member  states.  The  inability  of  the  EU  budget  to  raise 
funding autonomously to finance itself and to establish 100% risk coverage for all operations 
limits the budget’s capacity to play a larger role in offering effective MFS instruments to EU 
member states, especially for the greater economies of the euro area. 
But  there  are  other  considerations  that  formally  do  not  exist,  which  in  practice  are  very 
important in defining the role of the EU budget in MFS assistance. What the rules and official 
documents do not mention are the distortions in the financing of a potential default through 
the budget’s own resources system and the potential political cost of any default for the EU 
in terms of EU budget governance and operations. Theoretically there is an available margin 
and theoretically the member states have an obligation to cover any default by increasing 
their  contributions  to  the  budget  based  on  their  share  of  contributions  to  the  budget.  In 
practice, however, this is not so frictionless or uncontroversial. 
In the case of a default by a member state under the EFSM or BoP, the member states are 
expected to contribute to the financing of the liability. It is important to note that the Own 
Resources Decision does not exclude the ESFM or BoP from the UK’s correction mechanism. 
The  UK  House  of  Commons  estimates that  the  UK’s  contribution  to  an  eventual  default 
would  be  require  a  contribution  from  the  UK  equivalent  to  its  share  of  the  EU  budget 
contribution  (Thompson,  2011).  The  regulations  for  the  EFSM and  BoP  stipulate  that  the 
Commission will disclose the amounts for which the Commission has drawn from its own 
resources and request an increase if the cash reserves are not sufficient. This means de facto 
that  the  UK  rebate  applies,  and  also  the  reduced  contributions  to  the  rebate  by Austria, 
Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, as agreed in the Own Resources Decision of 2007 
(Council Decision (2007/438/EC) of 2007.
24 Consequently, poorer member states, as well as 
the defaulting member states, would have to contribute a share of the cost that would be 
higher than their share based on GNI. Yet, the defaulting country may still be held liable to 
eventually repay the guarantee through the own resources budget lines 800 or 802. If the 
country  reimburses  the  funds  the  problem  with  the  UK  rebate  would  be  neutralised. 
Nevertheless, the controversy on how the funds are raised at the time of the default and the 
political impact on the size of the annual budget would remain.   
This problem does not arise in the case of the MFA, as external expenditure of the Union is 
not accounted for in the rebate. The MFA, in fact, is covered by the external action budget 
line, which is not allocated expenditure in the terms of the Own Resources Decision and is 
thus not eligible for the UK rebate.  
2.6  Implications of existing MFS programmes for national budgets  
In addition to the risks directly connected to the EU budget (resulting from the EFSM, the 
BoP facility and the MFA, and analysed in the previous sections), another element has to be 
taken  in  account  to  depict  how  the  EU  budget  could  be  affected  by  the  current  MFS 
assistance programmes: their impact on the member states’ public finances. Given that the 
EU  budget  cannot  incur  a  deficit,  the  borrowings  undertaken  under  the  three  EU  MFS 
instruments are direct and unconditional obligations of the EU but are guaranteed by the 27 
EU member states, which are legally obliged by the TFEU to provide funds to meet all of the 
EU’s obligations, according to Arts. 310 and 323. Thus in the case of a default of an assisted 
                                                   
24  See  Council  Decision  2007/436/EC,  Euratom  of  7  June  2007  on  the  system  of  the  European 
Communities' own resources, OJ L 163/17, 23.6.2007. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF EU INSTRUMENTS FOR MACRO-FINANCIAL STABILITY | 41 
country, the EU member states have to step in and cover all the possible losses not already 
covered by the EU internal mechanisms.  
Consequently, fundamental to understanding the effect on the EU budget is assessing the 
potential impact on the national budgets of the member states of possible defaults of the euro 
area countries currently assisted by the euro area MFS instruments (the GLF and EFSF). 
Indeed, a devastating result for the public finances of the member states would not leave 
enough resources to fully bail out the EU budget.  
So  far,  euro  area  member  states  have  already  disbursed  €178  billion  in  official  direct 
assistance to Greece, Ireland and Portugal, through the GLF (€53 billion) and the EFSF (a 
total so far of €125 billion). In relation to the losses under the EFSF assistance programme to 
Greece, neither Ireland nor Portugal have to provide official guarantees due to their ‘step-out 
creditor’ position, so all the EFSF potential losses in this programme would be split solely 
among  the  remaining  member  states  (the mechanism  is  valid  also  for  Ireland  under  the 
assistance programme to Portugal).  
Table 10. Exposure of euro area member states resulting from EFSF and GLF loans 
Country  Guarantees provided  As % of total euro area 
assistance 
As a % of GDP  
Germany  79,870  28.9%  3.1% 
France  59,980  21.7%  3.0% 
Italy  52,706  19.0%  3.3% 
Spain  35,023  12.7%  3.3% 
Netherlands  16,821  6.1%  2.8% 
Belgium  10,230  3.7%  2.8% 
Austria  8,189  3.0%  2.7% 
Finland  5,288  1.9%  2.8% 
Slovakia  2,925  1.1%  4.2% 
Portugal  1,832  0.7%  1.1% 
Slovenia  1,387  0.5%  3.9% 
Ireland  868  0.3%  0.6% 
Luxembourg  737  0.3%  1.7% 
Cyprus  577  0.2%  3.3% 
Malta  267  0.1%  4.2% 
Greece  /  /  / 
Total  276,700  As euro area GDP  3% 
Notes: As of May 2011. € million.  
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on European Commission and EFSF data. 
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Tables 10 clearly shows how the potential losses due to the transformation of the guarantees 
provided by euro area member states under the GLF and the EFSF in actual expenses, could 
heavily impact on their public finances: this serious implication for euro area member states 
would  materialize  only  in  case  of  default  of  assisted  countries,  since  the  back-to-back 
mechanism applied under the EFSF and GLF assistance prevents other types of losses. Even 
without considering the possible bailout of the banking system, the potential losses for the 
official sector under the three assistance programmes would amount to €277 billion, around 
3% of euro area GDP, posing serious threats to the guarantees offered by the member states 
to the EU budget, especially for those countries who already face difficulties in financing 
their expenditures. Although this section deals only with euro area MFS instruments, it is 
important  to  underline  that  also  the  United  Kingdom,  Denmark  and  Sweden  could  be 
subjected  to  potential  losses  due  their  bilateral  loans  provided  under  the  international 
assistance programme to Ireland: their bilateral loans, however, amount only to €4.8 billion, 
thus the impact for national public finances would be minimal.  
A final remark on the analysis of the effects of potential defaults is needed: at the moment 
the  member  states  would  be  the  first  official  actors  incurring  losses  in  the  event  of 
restructuring/default on the official assistance given to member states through the different 
MFS  instruments.  In  fact,  according  to  the  current  institutional  framework,  seniority  is 
accorded only to the IMF, which would thus be the first institution to be repaid. Then, the 
Greek experience of debt restructuring has shown that the Eurosystem is actually treated as 
senior de facto, since all the Greek debt held by the NCBs of the euro area has been fully 
exchanged into safe EFSF bonds. Considering instead the degree of seniority of the different 
EU MFS instruments, the only instrument defined as senior is the ESM, while the EFSF, the 
EFSM and the BoP facility do not have any preferential creditor status. Thus in the case of the 
loans to Ireland and Portugal, there is not any agreed seniority of the EFSF against the EFSM 
or vice versa, and the legal effects of possible defaults on the countries’ official assistance 
debt is uncertain, since the only declared senior in that instance would be the IMF.  
3.  Democratic control of the EP in the decision to use MFS instrumentS 
Key Findings 
BoP and EFSM 
  The BoP assistance and the EFSM are EU funding programmes that are subject to the 
general EU legal framework, in which the European Commission is accountable to 
the European Parliament. Therefore, given that these two instruments are subject to 
the  EU  framework,  there  is  a  relatively  adequate  degree  of  public  audit  and 
parliamentary scrutiny of them. 
  The Commission and the beneficiary member state conclude an MoU detailing the 
general,  economic  policy  conditions  laid  down  by  the  Council.  Furthermore,  the 
Commission  provides  regular  reports  to  the  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the 
borrowing and lending activities of the EU.  
  Even though the European Parliament does not have the power to grant assistance 
under these programmes, as the loans are backed by the EU budget (budget lines 
have been created for the guarantees provided by the EU), the European Parliament 
can scrutinise the European Commission's actions with regard to these instruments. 
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EFSF and ESM 
  The  EFSF  and  ESM  are  independent  entities  established  by  agreement  or 
international  treaty  among  the  euro  area member  states  and  are  thus  outside  the 
framework of the EU treaties.  
  This means that democratic control of the actions of the member states with regard to 
the EFSF and ESM would mostly be exercised by the national parliaments. Yet this 
would  only  partially  ensure  democratic  control  at  EU  level,  as  the  national 
parliaments tend to focus on the position of their country and not on the functioning 
of the programme as a whole. 
  The  constituting  documents  of  the  EFSF  and  the  ESM  give  the  Commission  the 
important  roles  of  negotiating  the  policy  conditionality  attached  to  financial 
assistance and of monitoring compliance with it. Thus, even though the European 
Parliament is not directly involved in the ESM, it can exercise a degree of democratic 
scrutiny regarding the Commission’s use of EU resources for its work in the ESM 
framework.  This  role  falls  under  the  regular  powers  of  the  EP  established  by  the 
treaties and provides certain checks of the work by the Commission. 
 
Given the important amount of funds involved under the MFS instruments, it is extremely 
important to have in place systems for ensuring the democratic control of their use. This 
issue can be separated between the MFS instruments that are subject to the EU framework 
(BoP and the EFSM) and those that are outside of it (EFSF and ESM). This sections does not 
deal specifically with the MFA, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, MFA 
decisions are no longer taken by the Council alone, but in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure (co-decision between the European Parliament and the Council), which 
ensure a full democratic control of the European Parliament in the definition of assistance 
activities to third countries.  
3.1  BoP assistance programmes and the EFSM 
The BoP assistance and the EFSM are EU funding programmes that are subject to the general 
EU legal framework, in which the European Commission is accountable to the European 
Parliament. Therefore, given that these two instruments are subject to the EU framework, 
there is a relatively adequate degree of public audit and parliamentary scrutiny of them.  
Even though the European Parliament does not have the power to grant assistance under 
these programmes, as the loans are backed by the EU budget (budget lines have been created 
for  the  guarantees  provided  by  the  EU),  the  European  Parliament  can  scrutinise  the 
European Commission's actions with regard to these instruments. 
Under the BoP and the EFSM, the Commission and the beneficiary member state conclude an 
MoU  detailing  the  general,  economic  policy  conditions  laid  down  by  the  Council.  The 
Commission transmits these MoUs to the European Parliament and to the Council (Council 
Regulation No. 407/2010 of 11 May 2010). For each member state receiving a loan under the 
BoP or the EFSM, the Commission carries out a quarterly assessment on compliance with the 
agreed  macroeconomic  and  structural  objectives  of  the  programme  before  a  further 
instalment is disbursed and these reports are then made public. 
Furthermore, the Commission provides regular reports to the Parliament and the Council on 
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accounted  for  in  the  annual  financial  statements  of  the  EU  and  thus  subject  to  political 
accountability by the Parliament (the BUDG and CONT Committees in particular) by means 
of the budgetary adoption and discharge procedures. 
In both the case of the BoP and the EFSM, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) has full 
audit  rights  and  can  perform  financial  and performance  audits  of  all  the  borrowing  and 
lending activities of the Commission. 
3.2  EFSF and ESM 
The  EFSF  and  ESM  are  independent  entities  established  by  agreement  (EFSF,  2011b)  or 
international treaty (ESM, 2012) among the euro area member states and are thus outside the 
framework of the EU treaties. Thus, as intergovernmental, non-EU entities, the EFSF and the 
ESM do not fall under the direct supervision of EU institutions and cannot be directly held 
accountable in the EU’s institutional framework. The European Parliament, the ECA and the 
Court of Justice of the EU have rather limited roles in relation to these instruments: the ECA 
does not have a separate audit right of its own and the Court of Justice can only deal with 
disputes that are brought to it by an ESM member.  
This means that democratic control of the actions of the member states with regard to the 
EFSF and ESM would mostly be exercised by the national parliaments. Yet this would only 
partially ensure democratic control at EU level, as the national parliaments tend to focus on 
the position of their country and not on the functioning of the programme as a whole.  
The European Parliament indicated in its Resolution of 23 March 201125 that the creation of 
the ESM outside the EU’s institutional framework could create problems for its democratic 
control. More recently, other concerns have been expressed by some of the supreme audit 
institutions  (SAIs)  at  the  national  level  (Kees,  2012),  specifically  that  the  Treaty  lacks 
sufficient provisions for ensuring an effective audit and that the arrangements existing in the 
ESM Treaty for transparency and accountability are weak. 
Still,  the  constituting  documents  of  the  EFSF  and  the  ESM  give  the  Commission  the 
important roles of negotiating the policy conditionality attached to financial assistance and of 
monitoring compliance with it. Thus, even though the European Parliament is not directly 
involved  in  the  ESM,  it  can  exercise  a  degree  of  democratic  scrutiny  regarding  the 
Commission’s use of EU resources for its work in the ESM framework. This role falls under 
the regular powers of the EP established by the treaties and provides certain checks of the 
work by the Commission. 
Like the BoP or EFSM, each member state that receives assistance from the EFSF or the ESM 
is  subject  to  regular  assessments  of  the  fulfilment  of  the  policy  conditionality.  The MoU 
signed  with  these  countries  in  relation  to  the  EFSF  are  transmitted  to  the  European 
Parliament  and  this  practice  will  continue  under  the  ESM.  The  Commission  has  also 
proposed a new regulation (European Commission, 2011f) that aims at ensuring consistency 
between  the  processes  established  under  the  EFSF  Framework  Agreement  and  the  ESM 
Treaty, as well as the EU’s multilateral surveillance framework (Buti, 2012).  
Concerning an audit of the EFSF, its Framework Agreement does not include audit rights for 
the SAIs. But as a company registered in Luxembourg, it is subject to the Luxembourgish 
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legal requirements on auditing. Its articles of incorporation also provide for independent 
external auditors, adding to the existing, internal auditing process.  
According to Art. 29 of the latest version of the ESM Treaty, the external public audit of the 
mechanism is to be carried out by a Board of Auditors, consisting of five members appointed 
by  the  ESM  Board  of  Governors.  One  of  these  is  to  come  from  the  European  Court  of 
Auditors, with two others (appointed on a rotational basis) to come from the supreme audit 
institutions  of  the  ESM member  states.  The  Board  of  Auditors  will  be  able  to  undertake 
independent audits and will have full access to all the ESM documents.  
The  annual  audit  report  of  the  Board  of  Auditors  will  be  submitted  to  the  Board  of 
Governors of the ESM, which will then send it to the national parliaments and the SAIs of 
the ESM member states. The European Parliament is not mentioned in the ESM Treaty as 
being included in this process. As the by-laws of the ESM are currently being drafted, these 
provisions could potentially be extended to include the European Parliament in the list of 
institutions  receiving  the  annual  audit  report  by  the  Board  of  Auditors  as  well  as  an 
expansion in the audit tasks of the latter.  
4.  Potential future developments of EU MFS assistance 
Key Findings 
  To solve the systemic flaws of the euro area, different solutions have been proposed, 
requiring the need for a broader mandate for the ECB, a reform of the banking system 
and the creation of a fiscal union. The latter would imply the move from the current 
system, in which each country is responsible for its own debt, to a system of joint and 
several guarantee, in which all countries are jointly responsible for the common debt 
issued as Eurobonds. 
  The gains from the eurobonds of increased liquidity and lower borrowing costs could 
be of minor relevance. The real benefit of the mutualisation of national sovereign 
debts would come from restoring confidence in the euro area, reassuring markets on 
the solvency of member states.  
  Most  of  the  schemes  proposed  in  the  recent  period,  entail  a  joint  and  several 
guarantee  limited  to  a  certain  amount  of  the  national  debt;  few  have  a  joint  and 
several guarantee on the whole national debt and only one takes into consideration a 
pro-rata liability. However, none of them is based mainly on the use of guarantees 
offered by the EU Budget, therefore resulting in almost no impact on the resources of 
the Union. 
 
The financial crisis in Europe has highlighted not only the lack of enforcement of existing 
fiscal rules but also persistent, large, current payment imbalances within the Union and the 
euro area, reflecting substantial competitive imbalances.  
In their attempts to reduce competitive imbalances, peripheral countries of the euro area 
have embarked on a large widening of public sector deficits, provoking a loss of confidence 
by the markets in the capacity of the countries to honour their sovereign debts. Indeed the 
loss of confidence, if profound, may lead to a liquidity crisis, i.e. the countries would be 
unable to finance their debt rollover at reasonable interest rates. With increasing interest 
rates the liquidity crisis may then turn into a solvency crisis (De Grauwe, 2011). Amid the 
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of external deficits has mostly fallen on official channels and the ECB, along with official 
assistance programmes (EFSM and EFSF). Restoring private capital flows from the centre to 
the periphery largely depends on restoring confidence in the payment imbalances and the 
sustainability  of  sovereign  debts.  Euro  area  member  states  appear  more  vulnerable  to 
liquidity crises than non-euro member states with similar levels of deficit and public debt. 
This is a consequence of inherent flaws in the European financial system.  
First,  the monetary union suffers  from  a  “foreign  currency” syndrome  as  defined  by De 
Grauwe (2011), whereby member states have lost the economic policy instruments of interest 
rates or exchange rates and need the permission of an independent institution, which they 
do  not  control,  to  increase  liquidity.  In  addition,  the  ECB  and  NCBs  are  not  allowed  to 
provide monetary financing to member states, or notably, to purchase sovereign bonds in the 
primary market. The euro is therefore like a foreign currency, since euro area member states 
cannot print it. Moreover, there is only one monetary policy that must fit all regardless of 
divergent prices and wages, productivity, market structure, public spending and taxation 
(Micossi, 2011b).  
Second, there is a strong interdependence between banking systems and sovereign debts. On 
one side, member states are responsible for rescuing national banks, and therefore they are 
highly vulnerable to the costs of the banking crisis (Pisani-Ferry, 2012). On the other side, 
euro area sovereign debts are largely held by national banks, with bias for the bonds of the 
member  state  of  the  bank’s  headquarters  but  also  with  significant  exposures  to  other 
countries’ sovereign debts. This is partly due to banking regulation and regulatory capital 
requirements, which provide for zero-risk weighting for euro area sovereign bonds and their 
acceptance by the ECB as collateral in its liquidity policies. This interconnection implies that 
doubts about the sustainability of sovereign obligations are transformed into doubts about 
the banking system (Micossi, 2011b).  
According to Schoenmaker and Gros (2012), a European-level banking system would break 
this vicious circle and help to stabilise the euro area. Yet “the European sharing of banking-
sector risk is only feasible if (national) fiscal weaknesses do not threaten banking stability”. 
In  this  regard,  according  to  the  authors  banks should  diversify  their  sovereign  risk  (e.g. 
applying large exposure limits to sovereign debt) and national fiscal positions should be 
sufficiently sound to not seek financing from local banks. To this end the authors propose the 
establishment of a European Deposit Insurance scheme and a resolution authority to stabilise 
the retail deposit base and resolve troubled cross-border banks. 
Lastly, the ‘no bailout’ clause provided in Art. 125 TFEU excludes any possibility of direct 
fiscal transfers from the EU or one member state to another, in order to help a member state 
meet its debt obligations, as well as the assumption of guarantees for those liabilities. As a 
consequence any direct purchases of sovereign debt in the primary market seems banned, as 
this could entail a direct assumption of the commitments of a member state.  
Art. 125 TFEU states that neither the Union nor a member state “shall be liable for or assume 
the commitments of” any public body or entity of any member state, “without prejudice to 
mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project”. Thus Art. 125 allows 
guarantees for a ‘joint project’, which may well include financial assistance to a member 
state, provided that a) financial assistance is for the purpose of preserving collective financial 
stability,  i.e.  to  avoid  unwanted  systemic  fallout  from  a  local  crisis;  and  b)  financial 
assistance does not result in a fiscal transfer to a member state.  
The Treaty leaves broad room to grant financial assistance to the member states of the Union 
and the euro area in order to preserve systemic stability. Acts of financial assistance that 
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has been done, but also intervening in distressed markets to restore normal conditions, or 
exchanging  eurobonds  for  sovereign  debt  held  by  the  private  sector,  provided  these 
operations are undertaken at market prices.  
4.1  Existing proposals for new EU MFS instruments and their implications for the EU 
budget 
To  solve  the  systemic  flaws  of  the  euro  area,  different  solutions have  been  proposed. In 
particular, Pisani-Ferry (2012) emphasises the need for a broader mandate for the ECB, a 
reform of the banking system and the creation of a fiscal union. The latter would imply the 
move from the current system, in which each country is responsible for its own debt, to a 
system of joint and several guarantee, in which all countries are jointly responsible for the 
common  debt  issued  as  eurobonds.  It  is  widely  recognised  that  taking  collective 
responsibility  for  the  sovereign  debts  of  member  states  is  essential  to  reassure  financial 
markets. 
The idea of substituting national sovereign debts with the common issuance of eurobonds is 
an old one, but the reasons and expected benefits have changed over time. When the idea 
was first explored in the Giovannini report (2000), the aim was to enhance liquidity and 
market efficiency in the euro area. The crisis has accelerated the debate on common bonds, 
which are now considered an instrument to solve the liquidity crisis in the short term and to 
ensure financial stability in the long run. Eurobond proponents argue that in the short term, 
the  common  issuance,  which usually  implies  a joint  and several guarantee,  would  make 
these assets super-safe, decrease borrowing costs and make the debt of certain member states 
more  sustainable.  In  the  long  term,  better-rated  bonds  would  make  the  euro  area  more 
stable. Also, the large-scale conversion of national bonds into eurobonds would reduce the 
risk that a confidence crisis in relation to weak countries would spread all over the euro area.  
Eurobonds  would  also  increase  the  size  of  the  corresponding  market,  thus  protecting 
member states that have lost control over their currency from a liquidity crisis (De Grauwe 
2011).  As  a  highly  liquid  asset,  eurobonds  would  be  able  to  compete  with  US  Treasury 
bonds, helping the euro to be the second global reserve currency. In addition, eurobonds 
would have a positive impact on the banking system, since banks would be exposed to the 
same safe assets. 
Nevertheless, there are also several concerns arising from the mutualisation of debts. First of 
all, the joint and several liability would seem to violate the no bailout clause of the Treaty 
(Art. 125); therefore in some cases its revision would be necessary. Furthermore, the mutual 
guarantee would weaken market discipline and enhance moral hazard. Indeed, as member 
states  would  be  jointly  accountable  for  the  eurobond,  some  countries  could  rely  on  this 
guarantee and behave irresponsibly.  
To counter moral hazard and make eurobonds more acceptable to public opinion in more 
disciplined countries, member states should accept some elements of a ‘fiscal union’. This 
implies that freedom to issue bonds would be lost or reduced, and member states would 
have to accept an ex-ante approval or strict monitoring of their national budgets (or even 
sanctions) from an EU institution or an independent body. This would likely interfere with 
national  constitutional  rules  on  the  approval  of  the  budget  and  powers  of  national 
parliaments.  
Still, according to Gros (2011b) even the best-designed institutional framework could not 
suffice to maintain incentives for some member states to pursue fiscal solidity and good 
economic performance. This is because there are extreme differences in the member states’ 
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worked and sanctions are not effective because they are not time consistent: when a country 
is in trouble, it is not punished but receives help. The author concludes that a political union 
is essential for eurobonds but even then this scheme could only work if there were low levels 
of  debt,  because  if  debt  levels  were  high  the  market  would  consider  eurobonds  a  large 
transfer of risk and expect that future accumulations of debt would be treated in the same 
way.  
In  addition,  the  expected  advantages  of  eurobonds  would  be  unfairly  spread.  While  the 
lowly rated sovereigns would benefit from a reduction in borrowing costs, the highly rated 
issuers would in all likelihood lose on this score. In any case, as Gros (2011b) pointed out, 
given the yield differentials between large and small AAA-rated countries (in the order of 
30-50 basis points) the liquidity gains would be minor.  
In sum, the gains from the eurobonds of increased liquidity and lower borrowing costs could 
be  of  minor  relevance.  The  real  benefit  of  the  mutualisation  of  national  sovereign  debts 
would come from restoring confidence in the euro area, reassuring markets on the solvency 
of member states.  
In  this  regard,  a  number  of  schemes  for  the  common  issuance  of  eurobonds  have  been 
proposed and are analysed in the subsections below (summarised in Table 13 at the end of 
this section). As a general observation, most of the schemes described below propose a joint 
and several guarantee limited to a certain amount of the national debt; few have a joint and 
several guarantee on the whole national debt and only one takes into consideration a pro-
rata liability. However, none of them is based mainly on the use of guarantees offered by the 
EU Budget, therefore resulting in almost no impact on the resources of the Union. 
4.1.1  Blue bonds and red bonds 
According to Delpla and Weizsäcker (2012), the joint and several guarantee would cover the 
national debt only up to 60% of GDP.26 This part of the debt would be pooled to issue a 
common  bond,  the  ‘blue  bond’,  benefitting  from  the  joint  and  several  guarantee  of 
participating members. The debt exceeding 60% of GDP would remain national and on this 
part  each  member  state  would  issue  a  ‘red  bond’,  for  which  it  would  be  uniquely 
responsible. A blue bond would benefit from seniority status, and would therefore be repaid 
before  any  other  public  debt  (except  IMF  debt).  It  is  likely  that  the  seniority  status,  the 
liquidity gains and the joint and several guarantee of participating members would always 
warrant the triple-A rating for the blue bond.  
An independent body (a Stability Council) would propose the annual allocation of the blue 
bonds, which would be approved by national parliaments. Any member state could decide 
neither to issue the blue bond nor to provide its guarantee for a given year. The ‘opt-out’ of a 
major participant would undermine the confidence in the entire scheme; this threat would be 
an incentive for the fiscal discipline of other countries. The Stability Council and the possible 
opt-out would also work as a safeguard to avoid any attempt by countries to increase the 
60%  of  GDP  threshold  for  borrowing  in  the  blue  bond.  To  counter  the  moral  hazard, 
participation  in  the scheme  would  not  be  automatic  but subordinated  to  enhanced  fiscal 
credibility, and the blue bond would be allocated according to the principles of the Stability 
and Growth Pact and notion of general fiscal sustainability. 
The red bond, issued by national treasuries, would be ‘junior’ to the blue one and hence it 
would be repaid only when the latter has been fully honoured. The bailout of red bonds by 
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any  EU  mechanism  (EFSM,  EFSF  or  ESM)  would  not  be  permitted.  Therefore,  these 
instruments would be smaller in size, because they would finance only primary deficits. As a 
default of red bonds would not affect the blue tranche, it would be less disruptive and hence 
more likely. To allow for an ‘orderly default’, red bonds should be kept out of the banking 
system; they would not be eligible for ECB refinancing operations and banks holding this 
debt would be subject to higher capital requirements. 
It is likely that the ‘junior’ status, the reduced liquidity and the risk of default would increase 
the borrowing costs of the red bonds. Critics fear that “low-rated sovereign borrowers would 
be confronted [by] prohibitive costs on red national bond[s] and be immediately forced into 
debt  restructuring  as  they  could  no  longer  find  buyers  for  the  part  only  guaranteed 
nationally”  (Gros,  2011b).  Delpla  and  von  Weizsäcker  reply  that  in  order  to  reduce 
borrowing costs for red bonds, weaker countries would be forced to pursue fiscal discipline, 
thus acquiring fiscal credibility. This would have the effect of reducing the overall debt, and 
the borrowing costs for red bonds would become ‘quite reasonable’.  
Moreover, critics have called into question the real gains in terms of total borrowing costs, 
highlighting that the increase of red bond costs would offset the decrease in the yield on blue 
bonds, leaving the average constant. But Pisani-Ferry has pointed out that member states 
would in any case have the advantage of maintaining access to issuance, at least for the 
amount corresponding to the redemption of maturing blue debt (Pisani-Ferry, 2012). For the 
authors, the blue and red bond scheme could even be compatible with Art. 125 TFEU. On the 
basis of the Maastricht Treaty, a debt of 60% of GDP is deemed to be sustainable; therefore, 
the joint and several guarantee would apply only in the case of exceptional situations, such 
as a natural disaster, and in such a case, a bailout is allowed as foreseen in Art. 122 TFEU 
(Delpla and von Weizsäcker, 2010).  
4.1.2  Eurobills  
Hellwing and Philippon (2011) propose the issuance of ‘eurobills’: short-maturity securities 
(of less than a year) jointly guaranteed for a debt of up to 10% of GDP. Member states would 
finance the rest of their needs through longer-dated bonds (two years or more). Member 
states  would  no  longer  be  allowed  to  issue  short-term  national  bonds.  According  to  the 
authors, the main aim of this proposal is to prevent a liquidity crisis that eventually could 
turn into a solvency crisis. The short maturity would make eurobills effectively and credibly 
senior to other debts. The authors point out that “it is difficult to make long-term claims 
effectively senior because borrowers can engage in side contracts, hidden pledge[s] of assets, 
risk shifting and maturity shortening. These issues only become more relevant when we 
move from corporate to sovereign borrowing.” 
The credible seniority and the limited amount of issuance would probably make the joint 
and several guarantee acceptable to strong countries, whose participation in the programme 
is  important  also  to  prevent  their  short-term  papers  from  competing  with  eurobills.  To 
counter  the moral  hazard  effect  of  mutualisation, participation  in  the  issuance  would  be 
conditional on fiscal discipline and the country may be asked to pay a penalty interest rate if 
it does not meet the related criteria. Moreover, exit procedures are envisaged, representing a 
transparent, predictable and costly incentive for countries to stay in the scheme as well as a 
feature to enable the scheme to perform well. Strong countries would provide the bulk of the 
initial guarantee and weaker countries could be asked to pay a small premium over the 
eurobill rate (maybe related to their fiscal and debt situation). This premium could go into a 
fund for insurance (or be used temporarily) to offset the higher costs for others.  
The seniority and the cap on the amount of the issuance would minimise the moral hazard. 
First, as at least every year eurobills would have to be rolled over, the country asking for the 50 | CASALE, GIOVANNINI, GROS, IVAN, NÚÑEZ FERRER & PEIRCE 
 
short-term financing would be subject to an assessment of its market discipline. Second, the 
10% limit on issuance would prevent eurobills from bailing out insolvent countries, as this 
amount would probably cover only a small part of the country’s refinancing needs in a given 
year. Therefore the eurobills would not violate the no bailout clause and an international 
treaty may suffice. To avoid the negative feedback between a sovereign and a banking crisis, 
eurobills would also receive special prudential treatment to become the favoured asset for 
banks to satisfy Basel III liquidity ratios. The joint and several guarantee of member states 
would  be  relatively  well  defined  and  limited.  Thus  the  objections  of  the  German 
Constitutional Court may be overcome. The German Court stated that the Bundestag cannot 
assume “liability for other States’ voluntary decisions, especially if they have consequences 
whose impact is difficult to calculate” (Philippon, 2012). 
4.1.3  European redemption fund  
The German Council of Economic Experts (GCEE 2011) proposes a separation of national 
debt accumulated so far into a part below the 60% of GDP that – in contrast to the blue bond 
scheme  –  remains  national  and  a  part  exceeding  it,  which  would  be  transferred  to  a 
European redemption fund (ERF). The ERF would benefit from a joint and several guarantee 
of member states, thus providing affordable refinancing costs for highly indebted countries. 
All euro area members would be able to participate in the ERF but those under a structural 
adjustment  programme  could  join  the  ERF  only  after  the  successful  conclusion  of  the 
programme. From the start, the debt assumed by the ERF would be limited in time and 
volume. The transfer would be made for a fixed amount contractually agreed in advance, 
which could not be subsequently increased. The limitation in time and the fixed amount 
would  enable  the  scheme  to  respond  to  objections  by  the  German  Constitutional  Court. 
During the ‘roll-in’ phase, (whose length depends on the maturity profile of outstanding 
national debt over three to five years), the ERF would issue bonds up to the fixed amount to 
cover the refinancing needs of participating countries.  
In return, each country would be obliged to repay its own transferred debt over a period of 
20-25 years. At that time, the ERF would be fully redeemed and would then expire. Unlike 
other schemes, these eurobonds would be temporary and limited in volume, and their main 
objective would be achieving the full redemption of the excessive debt rather than financing 
the  joint  debt.  To  counter  the  moral  hazard,  participation  would  be  subject  to  strict 
conditionality for member states:  
i)  devoting a portion of tax revenues (VAT or income tax or both) directly to the ERF for 
fulfilling the payment obligations; 
ii)  guaranteeing national debts in the ERF through a 20% deposit in the form of foreign 
currency or gold reserves. This collateral would not be pooled; 
iii)  defining a medium-term consolidation and growth strategy; 
iv)  committing not to raise the national debt above 60% of GDP. To this end, debt brakes 
would be introduced into national constitutions; and 
v)  agreeing a burden-sharing of risk among the solvent participating countries. 
If  countries  failed  to  meet  these  commitments  during  the  roll-in  phase,  it  would  be 
immediately interrupted, while if the failure happens afterwards, countries would forfeit 
collaterals. According to the authors, the ERF could be based on an international treaty, thus 
changes in the EU Treaty would not be necessary. At this stage this scheme has received 
positive comments. In particular, Verhofstadt (2012) considers the “ERF a cheaper and more 
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be enough to act as a firewall for the likes of Italy or Spain, for whom the current EFSF and 
permanent ESM bail-out funds combined…would be insufficient”.  
A scheme similar to the European redemption fund has been proposed by Vincenzo Visco 
(2011b).  The  author  proposes  to  transfer  to  a  jointly  guaranteed  fund  the  national  debt 
exceeding 60% of GDP, thus re-establishing a level playing field among countries. The fund 
would issue bonds at 25-30 years. As the EU does not have the fiscal power to grant this 
debt, however, the market could view it as ‘junk bonds’. Thus Visco proposes the application 
of a financial transaction tax to finance the transfer. An earmarking of taxes from weaker 
countries is envisaged to compensate the increase of costs for stronger member states. The 
burden of compensation would be shared among weaker countries, according to the benefit 
they receive from the creation of the new European debt. Highly indebted countries should 
commit to fiscal discipline and structural reforms. 
4.1.4  Euro-Fund  
Christophe Chamley (2012) also highlights the need to devote a tax to the common debt. He 
proposes  the  establishment  of  a  Euro-Fund,  an  independent  institution  in  charge  of 
purchasing  50%  of  the  national  public  debt  by  issuing  eurobonds.  The  participating 
countries, by treaty, would transfer to the Euro-Fund a specific tax with priority on any other 
expenses. Each member state would have a separate balance in the Euro-Fund. Any excess or 
deficit of the tax revenues would determine a modification of the debt of the member state in 
the Euro-Fund, which in any case would not exceed 60% of its GDP. 
Tax funding would ensure the credibility of the eurobonds and solve problems related to the 
fiscal  transfer.  Countries  would  maintain  a  sovereign  debt  that  would  be  priced  in  the 
market. The interest rate on these sovereign bonds would obviously be higher than that on 
eurobonds and would depend on a country's commitment to fiscal stability.  
4.1.5  E-bonds 
Monti  (2010)  proposes  the  institution  of  a  European  Debt  Agency  (EDA)  in  charge  of 
borrowing  on  a  large  scale  through  the  issuance  of  E-bonds,  and  then  of  on-lending  to 
member states. The lending to member states should not exceed 40% of a country’s GDP. 
Governments  would  continue  issuing  their  national  debt,  for  which  they  would  remain 
individually responsible, to cover their finance needs exceeding the 40% of GDP threshold. 
This  mechanism  would provide  cheaper  funding  for  member states.  The  EDA  would  be 
considered a preferred creditor, compared with holders of their debt floating on the market, 
theoretically increasing the possibility of a default only on the latter. In turn, this should 
increase market pressure and yields on the floating debt, triggering a stronger incentive for 
member  states  to  quickly  reduce  such  debt  through  sound  fiscal  policies.  To  make  the 
proposal immediately attractive, it should be made clear that fiscally responsible countries 
would not be  forced to bail out  less disciplined member states. Therefore more effective 
multilateral oversight, tackling moral hazard, could be envisaged through an increase in the 
sensitivity of markets to national budgetary developments, and by making the possibility of 
a default on national debt more manageable by other EU countries, hence more likely and 
easier to price by the markets.  
In line with Monti’s proposal, Juncker and Tremonti (2010) envisage that the EDA would 
gradually issue bonds up to 40% of euro area GDP and that of each member state. Moreover, 
it would finance national issuance (up to 50% or 100%) and offer a switch between E-bonds 
and national bonds at a discount option. Thus E-bonds would decrease market pressure and 
avoid moral hazard; disruption on the primary market would be precluded and, because of 
the switch, bank losses would be more transparent. Finally, the EDA would reap a profit 52 | CASALE, GIOVANNINI, GROS, IVAN, NÚÑEZ FERRER & PEIRCE 
 
from the purchase of the national debt securities of the member states at a discounted rate, 
thereby reducing the cost of borrowing. 
4.1.6  Eurobonds for triple-A countries  
Georg Erber (2012) proposes that the EDA pools the debt of AAA-rated countries. Countries 
losing their triple-A rating would start to issue their own government bonds again or turn to 
the  EFSF.  Hence,  member  states  would  be  under  constant  pressure  to  maintain  fiscal 
discipline under the control of rating agencies and financial markets.  
In our view, this proposal fails to offer a solution to the current crisis. In addition, it gives 
rise to some concerns about the attribution to the credit rating agencies of such power to 
decide on entry and exit in the eurobond scheme. 
4.1.7  European safe bonds  
The  Euro-nomics  Group  (Brunnermeier  e  al.  2011)  proposes  that  the  EDA  buy  on  the 
secondary market sovereign bonds from members of the euro area up to 60% of euro area 
GDP. The weight of each national debt in the EDA portfolio would be fixed as a share of the 
GDP of the issuing country. Countries under a financial assistance programme would not be 
able to participate in the scheme, at least in the initial phase. 
The EDA would issue two kinds of securities: European safe bonds (ESBies) and European 
junior bonds (EJBs). The first kind would be ‘senior’ and would receive principal repayment. 
ESBies would be a safe asset with a triple-A rating and a yield similar to German Bunds. The 
second kind would be ‘junior’ and would be the first to be hit in the event of one or more 
sovereign  defaults.  Nevertheless,  the  EJBs  could  be  attractive  for  institutional  investors 
because EJBs would provide a high return. To create further liquidity for EJBs, the EFSF 
could act as the market-maker ready to buy and sell EJBs.  
The EFSF should be well capitalised, and a credit line with the ECB collateralised by EJBs 
could be envisaged. If the EFSF could not repay its credit line from the ECB, member states – 
according to the Treaty – would automatically recapitalise the ECB. The authors affirm that 
this scheme has all the advantages of eurobonds without their political constraints: it creates 
a pool of safe assets redirecting capital flows from across national borders to across tranches; 
it stabilises financial markets by providing liquidity; as a pure re-packaging of existing debt, 
it does not require further funding from participating members; and it does not involve a 
joint and several liability, and hence there is no need to change the Treaty.  
Capital regulation and ECB policy should be modified to incentivise banks to hold mainly 
ESBies rather than national bonds and to make them acceptable as collateral by the ECB. As a 
consequence,  the  perverse  link  between  banking  and  sovereign  credit  risk  would  be 
rescinded and demand for ESBies boosted. Some critics argue that “the suspicion about the 
potential fragility of a securitization of these assets cannot be dismissed…. Therefore this 
solution faces a credibility gap.” Moreover, the scheme does not appear to address the moral 
hazard problem, insofar as no conditionality is explicitly required (Erber, 2012).  
4.1.8  Stability bonds  
The European Commission, in its Green paper (2011a) proposes three options for “Stability 
bonds” jointly issued by member states, requiring strengthened fiscal oversight.  
The first option implies a full substitution of the national debt with stability bonds issued by 
the  EDA  with  joint  and  several  liability  of  all  the  participating  members.  This  approach 
would  create  a  large  market  for  these  bonds,  thus  enhancing  liquidity  and  breaking  the 
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discipline and commitment to structural reforms would be required. This framework would 
call  for  further  economic,  financial  and  political  integration,  and  most  likely  treaty 
amendments. 
The  intermediate  scheme  explicitly  recalls  the  blue/red  bond  approach  and  the  EU 
redemption fund proposal. 
The third option provides for the partial substitution of national debt with stability bonds 
underpinning a pro rata guarantee of member states. This approach has limited effects in 
terms of stability and integration of the financial market but also in terms of the risk of moral 
hazard. The re-financing cost for some countries would be unchanged or slightly lower since 
the credit qualities of a stability bond would be, at best, the weighted average of the credit 
qualities of the member states. To boost the demand for these instruments, member states 
could provide seniority through changes of secondary legislation and collateral, such as cash, 
gold reserves and/or the earmarking of specific revenues. These bonds would have some 
similarities to EFSF bonds, although the latter are meant to help finance member states facing 
a sovereign debt crisis while the stability bonds would be available to all member states 
independent of crisis situations. 




Implications for national budgets 
Implications for  
the EU budget 
Blue/red bonds  - Fiscal discipline 
- Possible increase of general borrowing costs or at 
least for the red bonds 
- If ‘activation’ of a joint and several guarantee on 
the blue bond 
No implications 
Eurobills  - Fiscal discipline (and penalty if not met) 
- Small premium to be paid by weaker countries 




- Devoting a share of tax revenue to the ERF 
- Putting up collateral for the ERF 
- If ‘activation’ of a joint and several guarantee 
No implications 
Euro-Fund  - A transfer to the Euro-Fund of a specific tax 
- If ‘activation’ of a joint and several guarantee 
No implications 
E-bonds  -  Fiscal discipline  No implications, but the 
EDA institutional 
arrangements are unclear 
Eurobonds for AAA-
rated countries 
- Fiscal discipline 
- If ‘activation’ of a joint and several guarantee 
No implications 
ESBies  - Recapitalisation of the ECB in the event of an EJB 
‘default’ 
No implications, but the 
EDA institutional 
arrangements are unclear 
Stability bond  - First option: fiscal discipline and if ‘activation’ of  No implications, but in the 54 | CASALE, GIOVANNINI, GROS, IVAN, NÚÑEZ FERRER & PEIRCE 
 
a joint and several guarantee  
- Second option: see blue/red bonds 
- Third option: ‘activation’ of a pro rata guarantee 
first option the EDA 
institutional arrangements 
are unclear  
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
5.  Conclusion 
Table 12. Overview of MFS instruments and their implications for the EU budget 
  EU common  
MFS instruments 
Euro area  
MFS instruments 
BoP Facility  EFSM  MFA  GLF  EFSF  ESM 
Lending capacity  50  60  –  70  440  500 
Remaining lending 
capacity  34  11.5  –  –  216  500 
EU budget 
implication  Full guarantee for date of repayment 
Indirect, thought their impact on 
euro area member states public 
finances 
Note: € billion 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
The  proliferation  of  EU  instruments  for  macro-financial  stability  has  been  remarkable  in 
recent years (Table 17) and has raised, prior to the concerns at the financial level, questions 
about  their  democratic  accountability.  For  the  two  MFS  instruments  designed  to  assist 
member states and subject to the EU legal framework (the BoP and the EFSM) there is a 
relatively adequate public audit and parliamentary scrutiny. This is not entirely the case for 
the two MFS instruments managed by euro area member states, the EFSF and from July 2012 
the ESM. As the ESM is supposed to have a permanent character it is even more important 
that its provisions for democratic control, currently deficient, should be strengthened. More 
information sharing and public scrutiny are needed for these instruments to enjoy the trust 
of European citizens. The by-laws of the ESM are still under negotiation and they should be 
used to fix the shortcomings in democratic accountability. In the case of the ESM, the results 
of the audits carried out by its Board of Auditors should be made public. Additionally, to 
improve  the political  scrutiny  of  the  ESM the European Parliament should  be  granted  a 
similar level of access to information as the national parliaments. The monitoring activities 
carried out by the European Commission and the ECB in the framework of the ESM Treaty 
could also be made subject to an audit by the European Court of Auditors – a measure that 
would allow for increased scrutiny by the European Parliament.  
From  the  financial  point  of  view,  the  EFSM  and  the  BoP  facility  are  guaranteed  by  the 
margins of the EU budget between payment appropriations and the ceiling of the budget. 
The analysis provided in the previous sections has shown how the margins are large enough 
in this and the next MFF to cover programmed defaults by currently assisted member states. 
However, it emerges how there is a need to clarify how a default will be covered by member 
states  and  the  participation  by  the  defaulting  member  state(s).  In  theory,  the  UK  rebate 
distortion in case of a BoP or EFSM default should not pose a problem, as the defaulting 
member state(s) will still be liable to the EU budget and would have to repay the assistance it 
received: the Own Resources budget lines 800 (for the BoP assistance) and 802 (for the EFSM) BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF EU INSTRUMENTS FOR MACRO-FINANCIAL STABILITY | 55 
have been created exactly for this purpose. In addition, the first potential default can only 
take place in the next MFF and the Own Resources decision that will be in force then is still 
under discussion. However, in practice this matters. The defaulting member state(s) would 
have had to contribute to the EU budget to cover its share of the amount through the Own 
Resources mechanism, including an additional amount caused by the rebates. This payment 
also would not count as a repayment of the loan, the country would be held liable for the full 
amount. Thus, in the future Own resources decision, macro-financial assistance of any kind 
should  clearly  be  excluded  from  any  rebate  calculations  and  maybe  incorporate  special 
clauses on the own refinancing of the default by the defaulting member state: a possible 
solution to this conundrum would be to exclude this operations from the UK rebate and not 
to require the defaulting member states to contribute to Own resources to recover the funds. 
In case of a repayment, the member states would be reimbursed based on shares of their 
contribution.  
Another  issue  that  needs  clarification  is  the  treatment  of the  fines  to  countries  failing  to 
maintain fiscal discipline and are penalised under the ‘six pack’ rule (Art. 12 of Council 
Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011)27. Regarding fines imposed by the Council to EU member 
states  in  virtue  of  Art.  126  of  the  TFEU,  the  Regulation  provides  that  such  fines  shall 
constitute other revenue , as referred to in Article 311 TFEU, and shall be assigned to the 
EFSF and in the future to the ESM, thus without constituting a source of revenue for the EU 
budget. However, the article does not stipulate how the transfer occurs, without defining if 
the Commission is in charge of collecting the amount and if the funding will pass through 
the EU budget. If the operations will be done using the EU budget, this will increase the 
variability of the budget, as the funds paid in and the disbursement are fall different years. A 
possible solution, would be the creation of a separate fund for the EFSF and later ESM, thus 
avoiding complexities and potential inconveniences with the EU budget. 
The size of the EU budget is an extremely controversial subject. In case of a large default it is 
not straightforward that the member states will be ready to finance the default without this 
having a repercussion on the annual budgetary discussions. Today, with the pressure to 
keep the budget down and to cut it, a default could lead to an ever-stronger reaction. 
Concluding, the EU budget does not represent the most adequate tool for MFS operations, in 
particular for the euro area member states, where providing financial assistance requires 
large amounts (Giovannini and Gros, 2012). For this reason EFSM is most likely going to be 
superseded by the ESM and only remain active as a guarantee for existing commitments 
or/and as an instrument of last resort, without being the instrument of preference. Yet the 
ESM,  despite  its  characteristic  of  permanence,  cannot  represent  the  definitive  answer  in 
terms  of  an  EU  instrument  for  macro-financial  stability.  Eurobonds,  under  the  different 
forms proposed, could be a plausible EU facility for macro-financial stability that could be 
used in a more or less near future: the existing eurobond proposals, however, do not seem to 
entail any direct implications for the EU budget. It is true that most of these schemes do not 
yet outline all the technical arrangements, but none of them make explicit reference to the EU 
budget. Thus, the main future implications for the EU budget could come mostly indirectly, 
trough the effects of MFS assistance programmes on the public finances of euro area member 
states. 
                                                   
27 See Council Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No. 
1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJ L 
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•  Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable analysts, 
•  Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research expertise 
and to extend its outreach,  
•  An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding board for 
the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals. 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Social Welfare Policies 
Financial Institutions and Markets 
Energy and Climate Change 
EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood Policy 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Politics and Institutions 
Regulatory Affairs 
Agricultural and Rural Policy 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
 